In these regulations, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(1) The industry body may, by agreement with a person who is the system operator for all or any part of the transmission system, appoint that person to act as the critical contingency operator.

(2) The critical contingency operator has the obligations set out in these regulations.

(3) The industry body may at any time terminate, or change the appointment of, or reappoint, any person as the critical contingency operator, subject to the terms of the critical contingency operator service provider agreement.

(4) The remuneration of the critical contingency operator is as agreed between the industry body and the critical contingency operator in the critical contingency operator service provider agreement.

(5) The industry body and the critical contingency operator may agree on any other terms and conditions not inconsistent with the obligations of the critical contingency operator under these regulations.

(6) If a person is the system operator of all of the transmission system, the industry body must appoint that person as the critical contingency operator for an initial term of 5 years beginning on the commencement date, on the terms of the critical contingency operator service provider agreement.

(7) Any appointment of the critical contingency operator beyond the initial term is at the industry body’s sole discretion.

(8) If at any time the person appointed to act as critical contingency operator ceases to be the system operator for any part or all of the transmission system, the industry body may terminate the critical contingency operator service provider agreement in accordance with the terms of that agreement.

In addition to any other terms and conditions required by these regulations, the critical contingency operator service provider agreement must provide for—

• (a) appropriate provision for liability; and

• (b) testing of plans and procedures; and

• (c) the publication of a communications plan and information guide.

The industry body must publish the critical contingency operator service provider agreement.

(1) Before the go-live date, the critical contingency operator in consultation with the industry body must develop a critical contingency Internet site for the purpose of providing a central repository for publicly available information relevant to a critical contingency.

(2) The critical contingency Internet site must be able to perform the functions required of the Internet site by these regulations, and be accessible by the public on and after the go-live date.

(3) The critical contingency operator must take reasonable steps to ensure the information on the critical contingency Internet site is accurate and up to date.

(4) The critical contingency operator must publish on the critical contingency Internet site all information provided to it by the industry body for the purposes of publication by the industry body.

(5) For the purposes of these regulations, the information referred to in subclause (4) is deemed to be published by the industry body.

(1) No later than 5 business days after the commencement date, each transmission system owner must provide the industry body with the information specified in clause 1(2) of Part 5 of Schedule 1 of the Gas (Information Disclosure) Regulations 1997.

(2) As soon as practicable after receiving the information described in subclause (1), the industry body must consult with all transmission system owners on a draft map depicting the transmission system.

(3) As soon as practicable after that consultation and no later than the go-live date, the industry body must publish a map depicting the transmission system.

(4) A transmission system owner must give notice to the industry body of any error or change in the boundaries of, and pipelines comprising, the transmission system as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the error or change.

(5) The industry body may amend or update the boundaries of, and pipelines comprising, the transmission system in response to any notice given by a transmission system owner under subclause (4) and, where applicable, must publish an updated map depicting the transmission system.

(1) On the appointment of the critical contingency operator, the industry body must set performance standards against which the critical contingency operator's performance is to be reported and measured.

(2) Before setting any performance standards under subclause (1), the industry body must consult with the critical contingency operator.

(3) Following the completion of any review carried out by the industry body under regulation 12, the industry body may revoke, amend, or add to any performance standards set under this regulation.

(1) The industry body must, on an annual basis, review the manner in which the critical contingency operator has performed its obligations under these regulations in the preceding 12 months.

(2) The review must concentrate on the critical contingency operator's—

• (a) compliance with its obligations under these regulations; and

• (b) compliance with any performance standards agreed between the critical contingency operator and the industry body; and

• (c) compliance with the provisions of the critical contingency operator service provider agreement.

(1) With effect from the go-live date,—

• (a) these regulations, and the critical contingency management plans approved under these regulations, replace the National Gas Outage Contingency Plan; and

• (b) the National Gas Outage Contingency Plan ceases to have effect except in so far as it relates to events and obligations and liabilities occurring or arising before the go-live date.

(2) MPOC, VTC, and any other transmission system code must be read subject to these regulations.

(3) If both a transmission system code and these regulations impose an obligation or liability in respect of the same matter, the obligation or liability in these regulations prevails to the extent that the obligation or liability in the code is inconsistent with these regulations.

A person is not required to comply with these regulations where that compliance prevents that person from complying with the requirements of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

(1) The development fee is a fee to meet the critical contingency development costs.

(2) The critical contingency development costs are—

• (a) the costs of the industry body associated with—

  • (i) the appointment of the critical contingency operator; and

  • (ii) the review and recommendation for approval of proposed critical contingency management plans under regulations 26 to 30 (including the costs payable to the expert adviser); and

• (b) the costs (if any) payable by the industry body to the critical contingency operator before the go-live date in respect of the development and establishment of any critical contingency management arrangements required under these regulations; and

• (c) the costs of the industry body in connection with the development and establishment of the critical contingency management arrangements.

(3) Every person who purchases gas directly from a gas producer during the 28 days after the commencement date is liable to pay a development fee in accordance with these regulations.

(4) To avoid doubt, the critical contingency development costs do not include costs incurred before the commencement date.

(1) The development fee is payable to the industry body.

(2) Every person to whom regulation 15(3) applies must supply to the industry body a return as at a date that is as soon as practicable after the commencement date and no later than 38 days after the commencement date (the deadline for supplying returns). The return must state—

• (a) the total number of gigajoules of gas that the person purchased directly from all gas producers during the 12 months prior to the month in which the deadline for supplying returns occurred; and

• (b) how many gigajoules of gas were purchased from each gas producer during that 12-month period.

(3) As soon as practicable after the deadline for supplying returns, the industry body must determine and publish a breakdown of the estimated critical contingency development costs.

(4) As soon as practicable after the deadline for supplying returns, the industry body must invoice every person to whom regulation 15(3) applies for that person’s share of the estimated critical contingency development costs calculated in accordance with the following formula:

(5) As soon as practicable after the go-live date, the industry body must determine and publish on its Internet site the actual critical contingency development costs.

(6) No less than 10 business days after publication of the actual critical contingency development costs, the industry body must invoice or issue a credit note to every person to whom regulation 15(3) applies with the difference between—

• (a) that person’s share of the actual critical contingency development costs calculated in accordance with the formula in subclause (4), with the necessary modifications; and

• (b) the amount of the estimated critical contingency developments costs invoiced to that person.

(1) The ongoing fees are monthly fees to meet the critical contingency ongoing costs.

(2) The critical contingency ongoing costs are—

• (a) the costs payable by the industry body to the critical contingency operator in respect of that year; and

• (b) the costs payable to any person appointed by the industry body to carry out any obligations under these regulations in respect of that year; and

• (c) the costs of the industry body associated with critical contingency management and its obligations under these regulations during that year.

(3) Every person who purchases gas directly from a gas producer during a month is liable to pay ongoing fees for that month in accordance with these regulations.

(4) In this regulation and regulations 18 and 19, year means a financial year unless the context otherwise requires.

(1) The estimated ongoing fees are payable to the industry body.

(2) Subclause (3) applies to each month after the month in which the deadline for supplying returns specified in regulation 16 occurs.

(3) Every person to whom regulation 17(3) applies must supply to the industry body a return no later than the tenth day of each month, unless otherwise agreed by the industry body. The return must state—

• (a) the total number of gigajoules of gas that the person purchased directly from all gas producers during the previous month; and

• (b) how many gigajoules of gas were purchased from each gas producer during that month.

(4) As soon as practicable after the go-live date, the industry body must determine and publish a breakdown of the estimated critical contingency ongoing costs for the first year or part year of operation of the critical contingency management plans.

(5) As soon as practicable after the publication of those estimated critical contingency ongoing costs, the industry body must notify every person to whom regulation 17(3) applies of the estimated critical contingency ongoing costs, and that ongoing fees will be payable by that person in that year or part year in accordance with the following formula:

(6) For each year following the first year or part year of operation, the industry body must—

• (a) estimate and publish on its Internet site, at least 2 months before the beginning of the year, a breakdown of the estimated critical contingency ongoing costs for that year; and

• (b) as soon as practicable after publication of those estimated critical contingency ongoing costs, notify every person to whom regulation 17(3) applies of the estimated critical contingency ongoing costs, and that ongoing fees will be payable by that person in that year calculated in accordance with the formula in subclause (5).

(7) On the first business day of each month following the notification in subclause (5), the industry body or the critical contingency operator must invoice every person to whom regulation 17(3) applies for that person’s share of the estimated critical contingency ongoing costs payable during that month, calculated in accordance with the formula in subclause (5).

(1) The actual ongoing fees are payable to the industry body.

(2) As soon as practicable after the end of each year of operation, the industry body must determine and publish on its Internet site, and on the critical contingency Internet site, a breakdown of the actual critical contingency ongoing costs for that year.

(3) No less than 10 business days after publication of those actual critical contingency ongoing costs, the industry body must invoice, or issue a credit note, to each person to whom regulation 17(3) applies for the difference between—

• (a) that person’s share of the actual critical contingency ongoing costs calculated in accordance with the formula in regulation 18(5), with the necessary modifications; and

• (b) the amount of the estimated critical contingency ongoing costs invoiced to that person in respect of the year.

(1) The due date for the payment of any invoice or refund of any credit is—

• (a) the 20th day of the month in which the invoice or credit note was received; or

• (b) if the day referred to in paragraph (a) is not a business day, the following business day.

(2) The fees payable under regulations 15 to 19 are exclusive of any goods and services tax payable under the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, and goods and service tax on those fees (if any) will be added to the invoices or credit notes issued under regulations 16(4) and (6), 18(7), and 19(3).

(3) The industry body must ensure that all information and returns that are supplied under regulations 15 to 19 are used only for the purposes of collecting the development fee and the ongoing fees.

(4) The returns supplied to the industry body under regulation 7 of the Gas (Levy of Industry Participants) Regulations 2008 (or, where applicable, any replacement levy regulations) are sufficient to fulfil the requirements of regulations 16(2) and 18(3) if the person who supplied the returns consents to the returns being used for this purpose.

(1) If these regulations require any notice to be given, the notice must be in writing and be—

• (a) delivered by hand to the nominated office of the addressee; or

• (b) sent by post to the nominated postal address of the addressee; or

• (c) sent by fax to the nominated fax number of the addressee; or

• (d) sent by electronic transmission or any other similar method of electronic communication to the appropriate nominated electronic address of the addressee.

(2) This regulation does not apply to the giving of urgent notices, but does apply to the confirmation of urgent notices under regulation 23(3).

(1) In the absence of proof to the contrary, notices are taken to be given,—

• (a) in the case of notices delivered by hand to a person, when actually received at that person's address:

• (b) in the case of notices sent by post, at the time when the letter would in the ordinary course of post be delivered; and in proving the delivery, it is sufficient to prove that the letter was properly addressed and posted:

• (c) in the case of notices sent by fax, at the time indicated on a record of its transmission:

• (d) in the case of notices sent by electronic transmission or any other similar method of electronic communication,—

  • (i) at the time the computer system used to transmit the notice has received an acknowledgment or receipt to the electronic address of the person transmitting the notice; or

  • (ii) at the time the person who gave the notice proves the notice was transmitted by computer system to the electronic address provided by the addressee.

(2) This regulation does not apply to the giving of urgent notices, but does apply to the confirmation of urgent notices under regulation 23(3).

(1) In relation to a critical contingency, these regulations provide for urgent notices to be given in certain circumstances.

(2) Despite regulations 21 and 22, an urgent notice may be given orally where the person issuing a notice considers that the urgency of the situation means the notice should not be given in writing.

(3) If an urgent notice is given orally under subclause (2), the person who gave that notice must, as soon as practicable, confirm that urgent notice in writing in accordance with regulations 21 and 22.

No later than 50 business days after the commencement date, each transmission system owner must prepare a proposed critical contingency management plan for its part of the transmission system and submit it to the industry body for approval.

(1) A proposed critical contingency management plan must be consistent with these regulations and must provide for the following:

• (a) a threshold for each part of the transmission system referred to in Schedule 1 that meets the following requirements:

  • (i) the threshold must be not be less than, and must not exceed, the relevant permissible limits for those thresholds set out in Schedule 1; and

  • (ii) the threshold must be specified in terms of the projected number of hours remaining before the minimum operating pressure is reached; and

  • (iii) the threshold must specify, as part of the threshold, the minimum operating pressure; and

  • (iv) the minimum operating pressure means the minimum pressure that is required to maintain the supply of gas across the relevant part or parts of the transmission system and to avoid disruption of distribution systems connected to the transmission system; and

  • (v) the minimum operating pressure must be measured at the points on the transmission system specified in Schedule 1; and

• (b) a description of the events that the transmission system owner considers may feasibly result in a breach of the thresholds referred to in paragraph (a); and

• (c) actions that the transmission system owner considers it may feasibly take to remedy any breach in those thresholds resulting from the events described in accordance with paragraph (b); and

• (d) a process, consistent with the curtailment arrangements, outlining the manner in which curtailment will be implemented, curtailment bands, how restoration will be implemented, and an explanation as to how these processes meet the objectives set out in Schedule 2; and

• (e) a communications plan, describing the communications that the transmission system owner must initiate by notice to the critical contingency operator, other transmission system owners, gas distributors, shippers, retailers, large consumers, and any other person it considers necessary before and during a critical contingency, the reciprocal communications, and time frames within which those communications are to take place; and

• (f) the contact details of any suitably qualified persons employed by the transmission system owner who the transmission system owner proposes will be responsible for—

  • (i) giving communications to the critical contingency operator and receiving communications from the critical contingency operator under the communications plan; and

  • (ii) giving directions in accordance with the critical contingency management plan; and

• (g) the circumstances, if any, in which the transmission system owner considers it may be desirable for the critical contingency operator to direct the restoration of gas supply in an order different to that (last curtailed and first restored) set out in the curtailment arrangements, including how, in those circumstances, that different order would better achieve—

  • (i) the purpose of these regulations; and

  • (ii) the objectives of the curtailment arrangements; and

• (h) a process, consistent with regulations 73 to 82, outlining the manner in which the contingency imbalances will be determined for each affected party over the period of the critical contingency, including—

  • (i) what information is to be used by the transmission system owner to determine contingency imbalances; and

  • (ii) how the transmission system owner is to allocate contingency imbalances to affected parties; and

  • (iii) processes outlining how the information concerning those allocated contingency imbalances is to be provided to the industry body for the invoicing of those allocated contingency imbalances; and

• (i) a list of the contact details for the—

  • (i) operators of gas storage facilities that are connected to the relevant part of the transmission system; and

  • (ii) operators of upstream gas production facilities that are connected to the relevant part of the transmission system; and

  • (iii) large consumers with a consumer installation connected directly to the relevant part of the transmission system; and

  • (iv) interconnected parties, retailers, and shippers who are trading across or utilising the relevant part of the transmission system; and

  • (v) gas distributors with a distribution system connected to the relevant part of the transmission system; and

• (j) a description of how the transmission information referred to in regulation 38 will be made available to the critical contingency operator; and

• (k) any other things that the transmission system owner considers appropriate to give effect to the purpose of these regulations.

(2) A proposed critical contingency management plan must be consistent with MPOC, VTC, or any other transmission system code except to the extent necessary to comply with these regulations.

Before submitting the proposed critical contingency management plan to the industry body for approval, a transmission system owner must—

• (a) consult on a draft of the proposed critical contingency management plan with persons that the transmission system owner considers are representative of the interests of persons likely to be substantially affected by the proposed critical contingency management plan; and

• (b) immediately before consulting under paragraph (a), provide a draft of the proposed critical contingency management plan to—

  • (i) the critical contingency operator; and

  • (ii) the industry body, who must also publish the draft of the proposed plan; and

• (c) give persons consulted with under paragraph (a) at least 20 business days to make submissions to the transmission system owner on the draft of the proposed critical contingency management plan; and

• (d) provide copies of the submissions to the industry body as soon as practicable after those submissions have been received; and

• (e) consider the submissions made and make any amendments to the proposed critical contingency management plan that the transmission system owner considers necessary.

For each proposed critical contingency management plan, and for each proposed amendment to a critical contingency management plan submitted under regulation 33(4)(c), 34(6)(c), or 65(3)(c), the industry body must appoint an expert adviser to review the proposed plan or amendment,—

• (a) in the case of a proposed plan, within 30 business days of the commencement date; and

• (b) in the case of a proposed amendment, within 5 business days of receiving the proposed amendment from the transmission system owner.

(1) As soon as practicable following receipt of a proposed critical contingency management plan under regulation 24 or a proposed amendment under regulation 33(4)(c), 34(6)(c), or 65(3)(c), the industry body must provide the proposed plan or proposed amendment to the expert adviser and the critical contingency operator.

(2) In reviewing the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment under regulation 29, the expert adviser must consult with the critical contingency operator.

(3) The critical contingency operator may provide the expert adviser with a report on the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment in relation to any issues it perceives as material to the review by the expert adviser under regulation 29.

(4) Any report prepared by the critical contingency operator under subclause (3) must be submitted to the expert adviser no later than 10 business days after the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment was received from the industry body.

(1) The expert adviser must review—

• (a) a proposed critical contingency management plan provided by a transmission system owner under regulation 24; or

• (b) a proposed amendment to a critical contingency management plan under regulation 33(4)(c), 34(6)(c), or 65(3)(c),—

to determine whether or not to recommend approval of the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment to the industry body.

(2) In reviewing the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment, the expert adviser—

• (a) must have regard to any report submitted in accordance with regulation 28(3) and (4); and

• (b) may have regard to any submissions received by the transmission system owner under regulation 26.

(3) Following the review, and no later than 20 business days after receiving the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment, the expert adviser must—

• (a) make a recommendation, with reasons, to the industry body on whether the industry body should approve the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment; and

• (b) give notice to the relevant transmission system owner and the critical contingency operator of its recommendation and the reasons for its recommendation.

(4) If the expert adviser considers that the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment complies with regulation 25 and gives effect to the purpose of these regulations, the expert adviser must make a recommendation that the industry body should approve the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment.

(5) If the expert adviser gives notice under subclause (3)(b) that it has recommended that the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment should not be approved by the industry body, then, no later than 10 business days after receiving that notice, the relevant transmission system owner—

• (a) must revise the proposed critical contingency management plan in response to the reasons given in that notice, and resubmit the proposed plan to the industry body for approval; or

• (b) may revise the proposed amendment in response to the reasons given in that notice, and resubmit the proposed amendment to the industry body for approval.

(6) Regulations 27 to 30 apply to a proposed plan or proposed amendment resubmitted for approval under subclause (5).

(7) The industry body must publish a proposed plan or proposed amendment resubmitted for approval under subclause (5).

(1) No later than 5 business days after receiving a recommendation to approve under regulation 29(3), the industry body must—

• (a) approve or decline to approve the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment; and

• (b) give notice to the relevant transmission system owner and the critical contingency operator of its determination and the reasons for its determination.

(2) The industry body must approve the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment if—

• (a) it receives a recommendation for approval from the expert adviser under regulation 29(3); and

• (b) the industry body considers that the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment complies with regulation 25 and gives effect to the purpose of these regulations.

(3) If the industry body gives notice under subclause (1)(b) that it has declined to approve the proposed critical contingency management plan or proposed amendment, the relevant transmission system owner, no later than 10 business days after receiving that notice,—

• (a) must revise the proposed critical contingency management plan in response to the reasons given in that notice, and resubmit the proposed plan to the industry body for approval; or

• (b) may revise the proposed amendment in response to the reasons given in that notice, and resubmit the proposed amendment to the industry body for approval.

(4) Regulations 27 to 30 apply to a proposed plan or proposed amendment resubmitted for approval under subclause (3).

(5) The industry body must publish a proposed plan or proposed amendment resubmitted for approval under subclause (3).

(1) This regulation only applies if a proposed critical contingency management plan submitted under regulation 24, 29(5)(a), or 30(3)(a) has not been approved by the industry body under regulation 30 within 6 months of the commencement date.

(2) To avoid doubt, this regulation does not apply to any proposed amendment to a critical contingency management plan.

(3) The industry body may itself amend the proposed critical contingency plan, if the industry body considers that the amendments are—

• (a) related to the reasons set out in any notice referred to in regulation 29(3)(b) or 30(1)(b); and

• (b) necessary to ensure the proposed critical contingency management plan complies with regulation 25 and gives effect to the purpose of these regulations.

(4) If the industry body amends the proposed critical contingency management plan under subclause (3), the industry body must give notice to the relevant transmission system owner and the critical contingency operator of the amendments and the reasons for the amendments.

(5) On the fifth business day after giving notice under subclause (4), the industry body must determine whether or not to approve the proposed critical contingency management plan as amended under subclause (3).

(1) As soon as practicable after the industry body has approved critical contingency management plans to cover all of the transmission system, the industry body must publish, both in the Gazette and on the industry body's Internet site, a statement specifying—

• (a) that it has approved critical contingency plans to cover all of the transmission system; and

• (b) the go-live date on which, pursuant to regulation 2, Parts 3 and 4 come into force.

(2) No later than 5 business days after the industry body publishes a statement under subclause (1), the critical contingency operator must publish the critical contingency management plans on the critical contingency Internet site.

(3) If a transmission system operator has given notice that certain information in a proposed critical contingency management plan or a proposed amendment is confidential or commercially sensitive, the industry body must determine whether that information is to be published by the critical contingency operator.

(4) The industry body must advise the critical contingency operator of its determination under subclause (3) when giving notice of its approval of the plan or amendment under regulation 30(1), and the critical contingency operator must comply with that determination.

(1) Each transmission system owner must ensure that the contact details included in its critical contingency management plan in accordance with regulation 25 are current.

(2) Each transmission system owner must review its critical contingency management plan to determine whether it complies with regulation 25, and whether it is able to give effect to the purpose of these regulations,—

• (a) at any time it is directed to do so by the critical contingency operator; and

• (b) at any time that the relevant transmission system owner is of the opinion that its critical contingency management plan may not—

  • (i) adequately comply with regulation 25; or

  • (ii) give effect to the purpose of these regulations; and

• (c) in any event, at least once every 2 years.

(3) Each transmission system owner must notify the critical contingency operator, within 10 business days of making a determination, that its critical contingency management plan may not adequately comply with regulation 25 or give effect to the purpose of these regulations.

(4) If notice is given under subclause (3), the relevant transmission system owner must—

• (a) prepare a proposed amendment to the critical contingency management plan that it considers would comply with regulation 25 and better achieve the purpose of these regulations; and

• (b) consult on the proposed amendment in accordance with regulation 26, except if the transmission system owner and the critical contingency operator agree that the proposed amendment is immaterial; and

• (c) submit, after consultation in accordance with paragraph (b) (if any), the proposed amendment to the industry body for approval in accordance with regulations 27 to 30.

(1) The critical contingency operator must, after consultation with transmission system owners, instigate exercises to test that—

• (a) the critical contingency management plans comply with regulation 25 and give effect to the purpose of these regulations; and

• (b) the contact details included in critical contingency management plans in accordance with regulation 25 are current; and

• (c) the list of emergency contact details maintained by retailers in accordance with regulation 43 is current.

(2) Transmission system owners, and any interconnected parties, shippers, retailers, and large consumers reasonably requested by the critical contingency operator, must participate in tests instigated under subclause (1).

(3) To avoid doubt, participation in a civil defence emergency management training exercise that tests the matters set out in subclause (1) is considered to be an exercise for the purposes of this regulation.

(4) An exercise must be instigated by the critical contingency operator at least once every 12 months, except if there has been a critical contingency within that 12-month period and the report produced in accordance with regulation 65 confirms that the critical contingency management plans meet the test criteria in subclause (1).

(5) Within 10 business days of completing an exercise under subclause (1), each transmission system owner must provide a report to the critical contingency operator that—

• (a) explains why its critical contingency management plan meets or does not meet the test criteria in subclause (1); and

• (b) identifies areas in which its critical contingency management plan can be improved; and

• (c) recommends to the critical contingency operator any amendments that the transmission system owner considers should be made to its critical contingency management plan; and

• (d) contains any other information that the transmission system owner considers is appropriate.

(6) Following the provision of the report provided under subclause (5), a transmission system owner may—

• (a) prepare a proposed amendment to the critical contingency management plan that it considers would better achieve the purpose of these regulations; and

• (b) consult on the proposed amendment in accordance with regulation 26, except if the transmission system owner and the critical contingency operator agree that the proposed amendment is immaterial; and

• (c) submit, after consultation in accordance paragraph (b) (if any), the proposed amendment to the industry body for approval in accordance with regulations 27 to 30.

(1) The critical contingency operator must, in consultation with transmission system owners, prepare a communications plan and publish it on the go-live date.

(2) The communications plan will govern the communications between the critical contingency operator and the transmission system owners during a critical contingency.

(3) The communications plan must apply to communications from the critical contingency operator to the transmission system owners, and from the transmission system owners to the critical contingency operator, relating to—

• (a) implementing curtailment of demand; and

• (b) revising curtailment of demand; and

• (c) restoring gas supply; and

• (d) terminating a critical contingency; and

• (e) identifying persons who did not comply with curtailment or restoration directions.

(4) The critical contingency operator may, after consultation with transmission system owners, amend and publish a revised communications plan.

On the go-live date, the critical contingency operator must publish an information guide that explains the communication flows between the critical contingency operator and the following parties during a critical contingency:

• (a) the electricity system operator; and

• (b) the director of civil defence emergency management; and

• (c) operators of gas storage facilities; and

• (d) operators of upstream gas production facilities; and

• (e) the industry body; and

• (f) the Minister of Energy and the Secretary; and

• (g) any other person that the critical contingency operator considers necessary.

(1) Before publishing the information guide, the critical contingency operator must—

• (a) consult with persons that the critical contingency operator considers are representative of the interests of persons likely to be substantially affected by the information guide; and

• (b) give persons consulted with under paragraph (a) at least 20 business days to make submissions to the critical contingency operator on the information guide; and

• (c) consider the submissions made on the information guide.

(2) The consultation process, including consideration of submissions, must be completed within 60 business days of the commencement date.

(3) If submissions made on the information guide are also relevant to the critical contingency management plans or communications plan, the critical contingency operator may consider those submissions in the preparation of any report on a critical contingency management plan under regulation 28(3) or in the preparation of the communications plan as applicable.

(4) The critical contingency operator may, after consulting on any proposed amendments in accordance with subclause (1)(a), amend and publish a revised information guide.

(1) Each transmission system owner must ensure that the following information in relation to its parts of the transmission system is made available to the critical contingency operator, whether via OATIS or otherwise:

• (a) metering (or other equipment) data on the amount of gas received into or taken from, and the pressure at or near, an interconnection point; and

• (b) in respect of each day, the net quantity of gas agreed between the transmission system owner and an interconnected party, or otherwise expected or requested, to pass through each interconnection point; and

• (c) data concerning the composition and quality of gas in its parts of the transmission system; and

• (d) technical pipeline information referred to in clause 1 of Part 5 of Schedule 1 of the Gas (Information Disclosure) Regulations 1997; and

• (e) any notices issued pursuant to a transmission system code by a transmission system owner in respect of its part of the transmission system; and

• (f) any of the following data that the transmission system owner has access to and is reasonably requested (for the purpose of performing its obligations under these regulations) by the critical contingency operator:

  • (i) mismatch or operational imbalance data; and

  • (ii) historical flow information, linepack, or pressure data.

(2) The information described in this regulation—

• (a) must be the best information available (including real time information if applicable) that, in the particular circumstances, is in the transmission system owner's possession or can be obtained or derived without unreasonable difficulty or expense; and

• (b) must be used by the critical contingency operator only for the purpose of performing its obligations under these regulations.

(1) Each retailer must provide a notice to the critical contingency operator, no later than 40 business days after the commencement date, setting out—

• (a) the number of the retailer's consumers who are supplied gas through each gas gate and who are in each of the curtailment bands set out in the curtailment arrangements, and their aggregate total annual consumption; and

• (b) the number of the retailer's consumers who are designated as minimal load consumers who are supplied gas through each gas gate and who are in each of the curtailment bands set out in the curtailment arrangements, and their aggregate total annual consumption; and

• (c) the number of the retailer’s domestic consumers who are supplied gas through each gas gate, and their aggregate total annual consumption.

(2) Whenever there is a change of 20% or greater in the aggregate total annual consumption figures provided by a retailer at a gas gate (including in each curtailment band) in accordance with subclause (1) or a change in the number of minimal load consumers provided in accordance with subclause (1), each retailer at that gas gate must as soon as practicable provide a notice to the critical contingency operator updating the information set out in subclause (1).

(3) If the retailer does not possess, or cannot reasonably obtain, a consumer’s or domestic consumer's actual total annual consumption, the retailer may provide its best estimate of that consumer’s or domestic consumer's total annual consumption as part of the aggregate total annual consumption required by subclause (1).

(4) To avoid doubt, for the purposes of this regulation, a gas gate does not include a point of connection between a distribution system and a gas measurement system downstream of that distribution system.

(1) Each large consumer must provide a notice to the critical contingency operator, no later than 40 business days after the commencement date, setting out its total annual consumption, curtailment band, and minimal load designation (if any) to the critical contingency operator.

(2) Whenever there is a change of 20% or greater in a large consumer’s total annual consumption figures or a change in its curtailment band or its minimal load consumer designation, the large consumer must as soon as practicable provide a notice to the critical contingency operator updating the information set out in subclause (1).

(1) The critical contingency operator must keep a record of information provided to it by retailers and large consumers in accordance with regulations 39 and 40, and such information must only be used by the critical contingency operator for the purposes of performing its obligations under these regulations.

(2) If the critical contingency operator considers that information provided by any retailer or large consumer is materially incorrect, the critical contingency operator must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, give notice to the industry body that a specific retailer’s or large consumer's information may be materially incorrect and provide all of the information provided by the retailer or large consumer in accordance with regulation 39 or 40 to the industry body.

(1) If the industry body is notified by the critical contingency operator under regulation 41 that a retailer’s information may be materially incorrect, the industry body must give the relevant retailer 10 business days to correct its information and provide the updated information to the critical contingency operator.

(2) If the critical contingency operator considers that the updated information provided under subclause (1) is materially incorrect, or the retailer does not provide the updated information, the critical contingency operator must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, give notice to the industry body.

(3) Within 5 business days of receiving notification under subclause (2), the industry body must give notice to the retailer that the industry body intends to conduct an audit of that retailer.

(4) The purpose of an audit under this regulation is to determine whether information provided to the critical contingency operator by the retailer is materially incorrect.

(5) The audit must be conducted in accordance with regulation 83.

(1) Retailers must maintain a list of the emergency contact details of all of their consumers who have annual gas consumption greater than 2 terajoules in any 12-month period.

(2) Retailers must include or remove (as appropriate) the emergency contact details of a consumer on the list maintained in accordance with subclause (1) within 40 business days of that consumer concluding a switch of retailers.

(1) The purpose of this regulation is to identify consumers who are essential service providers.

(2) Each retailer must, as soon as is reasonably practicable after the commencement date, notify its consumers that, if they wish to be classified as essential service providers, they must apply to the retailer in writing and that the application can be made at any time.

(3) A retailer must approve a consumer’s application to be an essential service provider if both of the following criteria are met:

• (a) the consumer provides services that are necessary to further the emergency response objectives set out in clause 59(4) of the Schedule of the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2005; and

• (b) the consumer can demonstrate that its annual gas consumption—

  • (i) was greater than 2 terajoules in any 12-month period within the 2 years before the consumer’s application; or

  • (ii) will be greater than 2 terajoules in the 12-month period after the consumer’s application.

(4) Each retailer must, within 10 business days of receiving a consumer’s application to be an essential service provider, determine whether to approve or decline that consumer’s application and give notice of its determination to—

• (a) the consumer; and

• (b) if applicable, the gas distributor whose distribution system is used to distribute gas to that consumer.

(5) If a retailer reasonably considers a consumer who has been approved as an essential service provider no longer meets the criteria set out in subclause (3), the retailer must give notice requiring the consumer to reapply under this regulation for approval as an essential service provider.

(6) To avoid doubt, a consumer notified under subclause (5) remains an essential service provider unless it—

• (a) fails to reapply within 20 working days of receiving such notice; or

• (b) receives notice under subclause (4) that the retailer has declined its reapplication.

(1) The purpose of this regulation is to identify consumers who require a minimal amount of gas during a critical contingency in order to avoid serious damage to plant, or mitigate serious environmental damage, while undertaking an orderly shut down of plant in the shortest time possible.

(2) Each retailer must, as soon as is reasonably practicable after the commencement date, notify its consumers that, if they wish to be classified as minimal load consumers, they must apply to the retailer in writing and that the application can be made at any time.

(3) A consumer must include the following information in an application to be a minimal load consumer:

• (a) the absolute minimum level of gas supply level required to avoid serious damage to plant or mitigate serious environmental damage; and

• (b) the period of time required for an orderly and complete shut down of plant.

(4) A retailer must, within 10 business days of receiving an application to be a minimal load consumer, determine whether to approve or decline that consumer’s application and give notice of its determination to—

• (a) the consumer; and

• (b) if applicable, the gas distributor whose distribution system is used to distribute gas to that consumer.

(5) A retailer must approve a consumer’s application to be a minimal load consumer if all of the following criteria are met:

• (a) the consumer would have no alternative arrangements that are economically feasible if gas supply was curtailed; and

• (b) the consumer is operating a major item of capital plant and that plant would sustain serious damage or significant environmental damage would likely be caused if gas supply was curtailed; and

• (c) the consumer can demonstrate that its annual gas consumption—

  • (i) was greater than 10 terajoules in any 12-month period within the 2 years before the consumer’s application; or

  • (ii) will be greater than 10 terajoules in the 12-month period after the consumer’s application.

(6) Within 10 business days of notifying a consumer that its application to be a minimal load consumer has been approved, the retailer and the consumer must agree in writing on—

• (a) the absolute minimum gas supply level required to mitigate serious damage to plant or significant environmental damage; and

• (b) the period of time for which it requires a gas supply to effect an orderly and complete shut down of plant.

(7) If a retailer reasonably considers a consumer who has been approved as a minimal load consumer no longer meets the criteria set out in subclause (5), the retailer must give notice requiring the consumer to reapply under this regulation for approval as a minimal load consumer.

(8) To avoid doubt, a consumer notified under subclause (7) remains a minimal load consumer unless it—

• (a) fails to reapply within 20 working days of receiving such notice; or

• (b) receives notice under subclause (4) that the retailer has declined its reapplication.

(1) If a consumer disputes the decision to approve or decline its application to be either an essential service provider under regulation 44 or a minimal load consumer under regulation 45, the consumer may by notice refer the matter to the industry body for review.

(2) As soon as practicable and no later than 10 business days after receiving notice under subclause (1), the industry body must review the decision by the retailer to approve or decline the application by the consumer and either—

• (a) confirm the retailer's decision; or

• (b) refer the application back to the retailer for reconsideration; or

• (c) approve or decline the application itself in accordance with regulation 44 or 45, as applicable.

(3) To avoid doubt, this regulation does not apply if the industry body has previously referred the application back to the retailer for reconsideration.

(4) The industry body must, in respect of large consumers, carry out the functions of the retailer under regulations 44 and 45 (and those regulations apply with all necessary modifications).

No person is required to comply with a provision of this Part to the extent that compliance would unreasonably endanger the life or safety of that person or any other person.

(1) The critical contingency operator must make a determination that there is a critical contingency if—

• (a) the critical contingency operator considers that a breach has occurred of 1 or more of the thresholds that are specified in a critical contingency management plan under regulation 25(1)(a); or

• (b) the critical contingency operator—

  • (i) has a reasonable expectation that a breach of 1 or more of those thresholds is otherwise unavoidable; and

  • (ii) considers that the determination is necessary to achieve the purpose of these regulations.

(2) When determining whether a breach of a threshold has occurred or is otherwise unavoidable, the critical contingency operator must assume that any occurring reduction in pressure in the relevant part of the transmission system will continue at a constant rate, unless the critical contingency operator has reasonable grounds for considering, based on the best available information, that a non-constant rate of reduction will provide a significantly more accurate basis for its determination.

(1) If the critical contingency operator determines that there is a critical contingency under regulation 48, the critical contingency operator must declare a critical contingency.

(2) Without limiting the powers of the critical contingency operator under these regulations to declare a critical contingency, the critical contingency operator must, as soon as is reasonably practicable after determining a critical contingency, give urgent notice to all affected transmission system owners—

• (a) advising them that a critical contingency has been declared; and

• (b) detailing the parts of the transmission system that are affected; and

• (c) advising them that they are required to comply with any directions of the critical contingency operator; and

• (d) advising them that communications under the communications plan are to commence immediately.

(1) If the critical contingency operator declares a critical contingency, the critical contingency operator must issue directions to transmission system owners that, having regard to the nature of the critical contingency, are—

• (a) necessary to achieve the purpose of these regulations; and

• (b) consistent with the relevant critical contingency management plans and the communications plan.

(2) To avoid doubt, subclause (1) does not prevent the critical contingency operator issuing directions in relation to matters outside the scope of a critical contingency management plan if the critical contingency operator considers those directions are necessary to—

• (a) achieve the purpose of these regulations; and

• (b) mitigate the severity of the critical contingency.

As soon as is reasonably practicable after declaring a critical contingency, the critical contingency operator must give urgent notice to the following persons that a critical contingency has been declared:

• (a) the electricity system operator; and

• (b) the director of civil defence emergency management; and

• (c) operators of gas storage facilities; and

• (d) operators of upstream gas production facilities; and

• (e) the industry body; and

• (f) the Minister of Energy and the Secretary.

The critical contingency operator must, as soon as is reasonably practicable after declaring a critical contingency,—

• (a) publish a statement that a critical contingency has been declared, the date and time that the critical contingency was declared, and detail the pipeline areas affected; and

• (b) ensure an appropriate critical notice (as defined in OATIS) is posted on OATIS.

(1) For the duration of a critical contingency, the critical contingency operator must—

• (a) monitor the pressure (including linepack levels) in the section or sections of the transmission system affected; and

• (b) receive and consider communications from the transmission system owners and any other persons identified in the information guide; and

• (c) explore available opportunities to increase upstream gas production and draw on gas storage, excluding any gas stored in the transmission system or any distribution system, in order to mitigate the severity of the critical contingency; and

• (d) for the purpose of stabilising the pressure (including linepack levels) in the part or parts of the transmission system affected, issue directions by giving urgent notice to transmission system owners in accordance with regulation 50 and the communications plan directing the transmission system owners to—

  • (i) implement curtailment of demand for gas in accordance with the curtailment arrangements and with these regulations; and

  • (ii) where necessary, revise curtailment of demand for gas in accordance with the curtailment arrangements and with these regulations; and

• (e) once pressure (including linepack levels) in the part or parts of the transmission system affected has stabilised to a level where the critical contingency operator is satisfied that it is appropriate to restore gas supply, give urgent notice to transmission system owners in accordance with the communications plan directing either—

  • (i) the restoration of gas supply to consumers in accordance with the curtailment arrangements set out in clause 3 of Schedule 2; or

  • (ii) if there is a civil defence emergency, the restoration of gas supply to consumers in accordance with The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan issued by the Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management under section 9(3) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, or any equivalent or replacement document under any subsequent replacement legislation; and

• (f) to the extent that is reasonably practicable in the circumstances, ensure the following persons are kept informed of the status of the critical contingency:

  • (i) the persons listed in regulation 51; and

  • (ii) affected transmission system owners, interconnected parties, retailers, and shippers; and

• (g) publish—

  • (i) updated information on the status of the critical contingency; and

  • (ii) all urgent notices given by the critical contingency operator.

(2) To avoid doubt, the critical contingency operator may direct curtailment of only a subset of load within a curtailment band (if it is satisfied that the direction would further the objectives set out in Schedule 2), including—

• (a) subsets of gas-fired electricity generation, to enable remaining gas-fired electricity generation within a curtailment band to assist with voltage support or electricity system stability or both (provided the critical contingency operator has consulted with the electricity system operator); and

• (b) geographical subsets of load.

If the critical contingency operator determines that there is a critical contingency under regulation 48, each transmission system owner must—

• (a) comply with the directions of the critical contingency operator given under these regulations; and

• (b) subject to paragraph (a), issue directions to retailers and large consumers—

  • (i) in accordance with these regulations; and

  • (ii) in a manner consistent with the relevant critical contingency management plan and the communications plan.

(1) Retailers and large consumers must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, comply with the directions of a transmission system owner given under these regulations during a critical contingency.

(2) Retailers and large consumers must provide a transmission system owner with regular updates of—

• (a) the retailer’s or large consumer's compliance with the directions of the transmission system owner; and

• (b) consumers’ compliance with the retailer’s directions issued in accordance with the directions of the transmission system owner.

(1) As soon as is reasonably practicable after receiving a direction from a transmission system owner under regulation 55(1), retailers must give urgent notice to their consumers affected by that direction—

• (a) directing the consumer to curtail demand in accordance with the direction from the transmission system owner; or

• (b) if applicable, advising the consumer that the consumer's gas supply has been restored in accordance with the direction from the transmission system owner.

(2) The urgent notice given under subclause (1)(a) must include statements as follows:

• (a) that a critical contingency has been declared by the critical contingency operator; and

• (b) that the critical contingency operator has issued a direction for the curtailment band that the notified consumer falls within; and

• (c) either—

  • (i) the consumer must curtail all its demand; or

  • (ii) if the consumer is a minimal load consumer, gas demand must be curtailed in accordance with the agreement with the retailer under regulation 45(6).

Consumers must comply with the directions issued by their retailer under regulation 56 as soon as is reasonably practicable.

Gas distributors must not act in a manner that is inconsistent with, or would frustrate, these regulations or any directions issued under these regulations.

(1) If a critical contingency has not been terminated under regulation 60 within 3 days from the date the critical contingency was declared under regulation 49, the critical contingency operator must give urgent notice of that situation to the industry body, the director of civil defence emergency management, the Secretary, and the Minister of Energy.

(2) On receiving urgent notice under subclause (1), the industry body, the director of civil defence emergency management, or the Minister of Energy may require the critical contingency operator to provide any information it holds concerning the critical contingency.

(1) The critical contingency operator must make a determination to terminate a critical contingency when the transmission system is capable of supplying gas to all consumers at the level at which gas was supplied immediately before the event that gave rise to the critical contingency.

(2) To avoid doubt, the critical contingency operator may make a determination to terminate a critical contingency under subclause (1) before gas supply has been restored to all consumers.

(3) If a critical contingency has not been terminated under subclause (1) within 12 hours from the time that the critical contingency was declared under regulation 49, the critical contingency operator may make a determination to terminate the critical contingency if it is satisfied that—

• (a) the supply of gas into the transmission system is sufficient to meet or exceed the reasonably expected consumption of gas following the determination; and

• (b) the determination would better achieve the purpose of the regulations.

As soon as is reasonably practicable after making a determination to terminate a critical contingency under regulation 60, the critical contingency operator must give urgent notice to all affected transmission system owners advising them—

• (a) of the date and time on which the critical contingency terminates or has been terminated; and

• (b) that they must give urgent notice to all affected retailers that the critical contingency has been terminated and must direct retailers to advise their consumers that the critical contingency has been terminated; and

• (c) that they must give urgent notice to all consumers connected directly to the parts of the transmission system owned by the transmission system owner that the critical contingency has been terminated.

As soon as is reasonably practicable after making a determination to terminate a critical contingency under regulation 60, the critical contingency operator must give urgent notice to the following persons that the critical contingency has been terminated:

• (a) the electricity system operator; and

• (b) the director of civil defence emergency management; and

• (c) operators of gas storage facilities; and

• (d) operators of upstream gas production facilities; and

• (e) the industry body; and

• (f) the Minister of Energy and the Secretary.

The critical contingency operator must, as soon as is reasonably practicable after making a determination to terminate a critical contingency under regulation 60, publish a statement that the critical contingency has been terminated.

As soon as is reasonably practicable, but no later than 5 business days after making a determination to terminate a critical contingency under regulation 60, the critical contingency operator must, in consultation with the affected transmission system owners, prepare and publish an incident report that states—

• (a) the cause of the critical contingency; and

• (b) the duration of the critical contingency; and

• (c) the actions taken by the critical contingency operator and transmission system owner during the critical contingency; and

• (d) the level of general compliance by retailers and consumers with the directions of the transmission system owners and retailers during the critical contingency; and

• (e) any other matters that the critical contingency operator considers are appropriate.

(1) No later than 20 business days after making a determination to terminate a critical contingency under regulation 60, or as otherwise agreed between the critical contingency operator and the industry body, the critical contingency operator must prepare and publish a performance report that—

• (a) assesses the critical contingency operator’s and transmission system owners’ compliance with these regulations and the effectiveness of the critical contingency management plans, the communications plan, and the information guide; and

• (b) assesses the extent to which it considers that these regulations, the critical contingency management plans, the communications plan, and the information guide achieve the purpose of these regulations; and

• (c) identifies, where applicable, any amendments to these regulations, the critical contingency management plans, the communications plan, and the information guide that it considers would better achieve the purpose of these regulations.

(2) In preparing the performance report under subclause (1), the critical contingency operator must consult with—

• (a) each affected transmission system owner; and

• (b) any other person it considers necessary.

(3) If the performance report identifies an amendment to a critical contingency management plan, the relevant transmission system owner must—

• (a) prepare a proposed amendment to the critical contingency management plan that is consistent with the amendment identified in the performance report; and

• (b) consult on the proposed amendment in accordance with regulation 26, except if the transmission system owner and the critical contingency operator agree that the proposed amendment is immaterial; and

• (c) submit the proposed amendment to the industry body for approval in accordance with regulations 27 to 30.

(4) If the performance report identifies an amendment to the communications plan or information guide, the critical contingency operator must amend and publish a revised communications plan in accordance with regulation 35 or a revised information guide in accordance with regulation 37, as applicable.

A transmission system owner must provide any information and assistance reasonably requested by the critical contingency operator for the purpose of preparing the reports under regulations 64 and 65.

The purpose of regulations 68 to 71 is to determine a critical contingency price to be applied to the contingency imbalances sustained by interconnected parties and shippers during a critical contingency to—

• (a) avoid shippers instructing their suppliers of gas to reduce supply during a critical contingency when those shippers’ consumers have been curtailed; and

• (b) signal to suppliers and consumers of gas that it is a scarce and valuable product during a critical contingency; and

• (c) provide incentives before a critical contingency, particularly for retailers who supply gas to consumers who are unlikely to be curtailed, to make alternative arrangements to minimise the financial consequences of a critical contingency.

(1) Each transmission system owner, interconnected party, and shipper who will be affected by the determination of a critical contingency price may nominate 1 person to be considered by the industry body when appointing an independent industry expert to determine the critical contingency price.

(2) Each affected transmission system owner, interconnected party, and shipper must provide the name, qualifications, and industry associations of their nominee to the industry body in writing within 5 business days of the termination of a critical contingency.

(1) Subject to subclauses (2) to (4), the industry body must appoint an industry expert to determine the critical contingency price from the persons nominated under regulation 68 within 10 business days of the termination of a critical contingency.

(2) The industry body must only appoint a person nominated under regulation 68 if the industry body considers that the nominee would be an independent and suitably qualified industry expert.

(3) No person may be appointed as an independent industry expert under this regulation if the person—

• (a) has a material financial interest in an industry participant; or

• (b) is a director, officer, member, employee, or trustee of an industry participant; or

• (c) is otherwise directly or indirectly materially interested in an industry participant.

(4) If the industry body considers that none of the nominees would be an independent industry expert, the industry body has absolute discretion to appoint an independent industry expert who has not been nominated under regulation 68.

(5) The industry body must publish the appointment of the industry expert within 2 business days of making such an appointment.

(6) The following are both final and binding on all affected transmission system owners, interconnected parties, and shippers:

• (a) a decision of the industry body to appoint a person as the industry expert; and

• (b) a determination of the critical contingency price by the industry expert.

(1) The industry expert is appointed as a service provider on the terms and conditions set out in a service provider agreement.

(2) The remuneration of the industry expert is as agreed between the industry body and the industry expert in the service provider agreement.

(1) The industry expert must determine the critical contingency price in dollars per gigajoule of gas.

(2) The industry expert must seek to set the critical contingency price at a level that reflects the price that would be established by an efficient short-term market that allocated scarce gas resources to the highest value uses during the critical contingency.

(3) If—

• (a) only consumers in curtailment bands 0 and 1a, or 0, 1a, and 1b, were curtailed during the critical contingency, the industry expert must base his or her determination on the prices in the wholesale market for electricity during the critical contingency except where that would be contrary to subclause (2); and

• (b) any other circumstances apply, the industry expert must take into account the following matters:

  • (i) the prices in the wholesale market for electricity during the critical contingency; and

  • (ii) the economic cost of the loss of gas supply to those consumers who had their gas supply curtailed; and

  • (iii) any other matters that the industry expert considers relevant to achieving subclause (2).

(1) No later than 15 business days after being appointed under regulation 69(1), the industry expert must give notice of the proposed critical contingency price, with reasons, to—

• (a) affected transmission system owners and potentially affected parties; and

• (b) the industry body; and

• (c) any affected gas distributor, retailer, or large consumer who has advised the industry body that it wishes to receive such notice.

(2) The persons listed in subclause (1) may make a submission, including giving any relevant information, to the industry expert on the proposed critical contingency price.

(3) Any submission must be provided to the industry expert no later than 5 business days after the notice in subclause (1) is given.

(4) No later than 10 business days after giving notice under subclause (1), the industry expert must, after considering any submissions provided in accordance with this regulation, give notice of the critical contingency price, with reasons, to the persons listed in subclause (1).

(1) The objectives of regulations 74 to 82 are to—

• (a) ensure the gas supplied and consumed during a critical contingency and any resulting contingency imbalances are accurately determined and allocated to affected parties; and

• (b) ensure fair, effective, and transparent arrangements are implemented for the determination, allocation, and payment of contingency imbalances between affected parties.

(2) The industry body may perform its functions under regulations 76, 78, and 79 by entering into an arrangement or contract with any person or persons for the performance of those functions.

(1) Within 35 business days of the end of the month in which a critical contingency was terminated, the transmission system owner must determine the contingency imbalances for each affected party over the period of the critical contingency.

(2) A contingency imbalance may be a negative contingency imbalance or a positive contingency imbalance and, for the purposes of these regulations,—

• (a) a negative contingency imbalance means,—

  • (i) for an interconnected party who injects gas into the transmission system at an interconnection point, the amount by which the quantity of gas which that party has contractually agreed to inject exceeds the measured quantity of gas injected; and

  • (ii) for an interconnected party who takes gas from the transmission system at an interconnection point, the amount by which the measured quantity of gas taken exceeds the amount of gas which that party was contractually entitled to take; and

  • (iii) for a shipper, the amount by which that party and its consumers have or are considered to have, taking into account any allocation results under the Gas (Downstream Reconciliation) Rules 2008, in aggregate taken more gas than the total gas which that party was contractually entitled to take; and

• (b) a positive contingency imbalance means,—

  • (i) for an interconnected party who injects gas into the transmission system at an interconnection point, the amount by which the measured quantity of gas injected exceeds the quantity of gas which that party has contractually agreed to inject; and

  • (ii) for an interconnected party who takes gas from the transmission system at an interconnection point, the amount by which the quantity of gas which that party was contractually entitled to take exceeds the measured quantity of amount of gas taken by that party; and

  • (iii) for a shipper, the amount by which that party and its consumers have or are considered to have, taking into account any allocation results under the Gas (Downstream Reconciliation) Rules 2008, in aggregate taken less gas than the total gas which that party was contractually entitled to take; and

• (c) if aggregate negative contingency imbalances exceed aggregate positive contingency imbalances, the difference will have arisen from the consumption of linepack provided by the transmission system owner to maintain gas supply during the critical contingency and must be treated as a positive contingency imbalance to be allocated to the relevant transmission system owner.

(3) In accordance with regulations 75 to 79,—

• (a) each party with a negative contingency imbalance is liable to pay the critical contingency price for each gigajoule of that imbalance; and

• (b) each party with a positive contingency imbalance is entitled to receive the critical contingency price for each gigajoule of that imbalance.

(4) In this regulation, Gas (Downstream Reconciliation) Rules 2008 includes any gas governance regulations or rules concerning downstream and upstream reconciliation.

When determining a contingency imbalance for each affected party, the transmission system owner must—

• (a) use the best information available that is in its possession or can be obtained or derived without unreasonable difficulty or expense in the 35 business days after the end of the month in which the critical contingency was terminated; and

• (b) calculate the contingency imbalances for the period of the critical contingency either—

  • (i) on a part-day basis, commencing and concluding on the nearest hour to that on which the critical contingency was declared and terminated; or

  • (ii) where the information required to calculate on a part-day basis cannot be obtained or derived by all transmission system owners in accordance with paragraph (a), on a whole-day basis—

    • (A) commencing at 0000 hours on the day on which the critical contingency was declared; and

    • (B) concluding at 2400 hours on the day on which the critical contingency was terminated; and

• (c) assume that interconnected parties, retailers, and shippers, and their consumers, have complied with any curtailment directions issued by the critical contingency operator during the critical contingency when determining quantities consumed, unless there is evidence to the contrary; and

• (d) proportionally adjust quantities consumed on the basis of any evidence that interconnected parties, retailers, and shippers, or their consumers, did not comply with curtailment instructions; and

• (e) treat trades—

  • (i) purchasing gas over the transmission system as injections into the transmission system; and

  • (ii) selling gas over the transmission system as withdrawals from the transmission system; and

• (f) in respect of changes in linepack across the relevant part or parts of the transmission system affected during a critical contingency,—

  • (i) if the aggregate amount of all negative imbalances over the period of the critical contingency is greater than the aggregate value of all positive imbalances, treat that difference as if it arose from the consumption of linepack provided by the transmission system owner to maintain gas supply during the critical contingency and as if it were a positive contingency imbalance to be allocated to the relevant transmission system owner; and

  • (ii) if the aggregate amount of all negative imbalances is less than the aggregate value of all positive imbalances, treat that difference as if it arose from an increase in linepack during the critical contingency and accordingly—

    • (A) the amount of each positive contingency imbalance must be adjusted in accordance with the following formula:

      M_A = M_+ve × (∑M_−ve/∑M_+ve)

      where—

      M_A

      is the adjusted positive imbalance of an affected party (person A) in gigajoules to be used in accordance with paragraph (h)

      M_+ve

      is the positive imbalance of person A in gigajoules

      ∑M_−ve

      is the absolute value of the total of all the negative imbalances of affected parties in gigajoules

      ∑M_+ve

      is the total of all the positive imbalances of affected parties in gigajoules; and

    • (B) to avoid doubt, the difference between the adjusted positive imbalance (M_A) and the unadjusted positive imbalance (M_+ve) in subsubparagraph (A) must be accounted for by transmission system owners under their respective contractual arrangements with the affected party concerned; and

• (g) calculate the volume of each contingency imbalance for the critical contingency in gigajoules; and

• (h) calculate the value of each contingency imbalance for the critical contingency in accordance with the following formula:

  X_A = P × M_A

  where—

  X_A

  is the amount in dollars to be received by or paid by (as applicable) a transmission system owner or affected party (person A)

  P

  is the critical contingency price in dollars per gigajoule as notified by the industry expert in accordance with regulation 72(4)

  M_A

  is the positive or negative imbalance of person A in gigajoules (or, if applicable, the positive imbalance as adjusted under paragraph (f)(ii)).

The industry body must receive and hold the payments made in accordance with regulation 78 in a secure and separate bank account in trust for the benefit of parties with a positive contingency imbalance.

(1) On the next business day following the date specified in regulation 74(1), a transmission owner must provide to the industry body—

• (a) the amounts (volume and value) of each positive and negative contingency imbalance calculated in accordance with regulations 74 and 75; and

• (b) the associated information used to calculate those imbalances in accordance with regulations 74 and 75.

(2) For the purposes of the information referred to in subclause (1),—

• (a) the industry body may give notice to transmission system owners specifying the format that the information must be provided in; and

• (b) transmission system owners must provide the information to the industry body in that format.

(1) On the first business day of the month that is 2 months after the month in which the critical contingency was terminated, the industry body must issue invoices to affected parties with negative contingency imbalances for the amounts provided in accordance with regulation 77.

(2) No later than the 20th day of the month after the month in which the invoice was issued, each affected party with a negative contingency imbalance determined under regulations 74 and 75 must pay the amount stated on the invoice to the industry body.

(1) On the first business day of the month that is 2 months after the month in which the critical contingency was terminated, the industry body must issue credit notes to affected parties and transmission system owners with positive contingency imbalances for the amounts provided in accordance with regulation 77.

(2) On the last business day of any month during which the payments required under regulation 78 have been received, the industry body must pay the amount calculated in accordance with the following formula to each transmission system owner and affected party with a positive contingency imbalance:

(3) Subject to subclause (4), the industry body must make subsequent payments to transmission system owners and affected parties calculated in accordance with subclause (2) so that the amount stated in the credit note is fully paid out to those interconnected parties and shippers.

(4) The industry body is not required to pay out an amount greater than the total amount of payments received under regulation 78(2) held in its contingency cash pool at that time.

(1) If a transmission system owner or an affected party who has been allocated a contingency imbalance under regulations 74 to 79 considers that a contingency imbalance has been calculated or allocated in error, the person must advise the industry body of the error as soon as practicable.

(2) Subclause (3) applies if the industry body considers—

• (a) an error has occurred; and

• (b) the error has resulted in a materially different allocation of a contingency imbalance than would have resulted had the error not occurred.

(3) The industry body may give notice to the relevant transmission system owners directing them to recalculate any affected imbalances in accordance with regulations 74 and 75 and resubmit the corrected contingency imbalance information to the industry body under regulation 77.

(4) If subclause (3) applies, then the industry body must—

• (a) immediately give notice to all affected persons of the error and that the contingency imbalances are to be adjusted based on corrected contingency imbalance information; and

• (b) as soon as practicable after receiving the corrected contingency imbalance information under subclause (3), reissue invoices and credit notes under regulations 78(1) and 79(1), as applicable, for the difference between the incorrect and the adjusted contingency imbalances.

(5) Regulations 78(2) and 79(2) to (4) apply to any adjusted contingency imbalances, with all necessary modifications.

(6) The industry body may not give notice under subclause (3) later than 6 months after the date that the relevant critical contingency was terminated.

(1) A payment made under these regulations in relation to a contingency imbalance discharges in full any payment obligation or liability under MPOC, VTC, or any other transmission system code in respect of the same contingency imbalance.

(2) This regulation does not limit regulation 13(2) and (3).

(1) In this regulation, a regional critical contingency means a critical contingency where—

• (a) there is a substantial reduction to, or total loss of, the supply of gas to a part of the transmission system; and

• (b) that part of the transmission system has become isolated from any other significant sources of gas supply.

(2) Regulations 67 to 81 do not apply to a regional critical contingency.

(1) In appointing an auditor to conduct an audit of a retailer under regulation 42, the industry body must appoint a person who is independent of, and not in a position of conflict of interest with, the retailer that is to be audited.

(2) No officer or employee of the industry body may be appointed as an auditor.

(3) The retailer that is to be the subject of the audit may recommend 1 or more auditors for the industry body's consideration.

(4) In conducting an audit, the auditor may request any information from the retailer or the industry body.

(5) The request must be reasonable and strictly for the purposes of the audit.

(6) In providing information to the auditor, the retailer or the industry body may indicate to the auditor that the information is considered to be confidential.

(7) The auditor must prepare a written audit report and, within the time frame agreed with the industry body, give that audit report to both the industry body and the retailer audited.

(8) The audit report may be used—

• (a) for the purposes of any functions or processes set out in these regulations, the Gas Governance (Compliance) Regulations 2008, and any other gas governance regulations or rules made under Part 4A of the Act; and

• (b) by the industry body to require the retailer to provide correct information to the critical contingency operator for the purposes of regulation 39.

(9) The retailer being audited must pay the costs of the audit.

(10) For the purposes of this regulation, the costs of the auditor are those costs that have been agreed between the industry body and the auditor.

(1) If a national gas contingency or a regional gas contingency (as defined in the National Gas Outage Contingency Plan) occurs before the go-live date, the National Gas Outage Contingency Plan will apply to those persons participating in that plan.

(2) To avoid doubt, before the go-live date, Parts 3 and 4 of these regulations do not apply to a national gas contingency or a regional gas contingency under the National Gas Outage Contingency Plan.

The critical contingency operator’s role under these regulations is distinct and separate from any other role or capacity, including as a transmission system owner or system operator, that the critical contingency operator may have under the MPOC, VTC (or other transmission system code), or any contractual agreement.