This Act applies to all offences for which the offender may be proceeded against and tried in New Zealand.

This Act applies to all acts done or omitted in New Zealand.

Subject to the provisions of section 7, no act done or omitted outside New Zealand is an offence, unless it is an offence by virtue of any provision of this Act or of any other enactment.

For the purpose of jurisdiction, where any act or omission forming part of any offence, or any event necessary to the completion of any offence, occurs in New Zealand, the offence shall be deemed to be committed in New Zealand, whether the person charged with the offence was in New Zealand or not at the time of the act, omission, or event.

Even if the acts or omissions alleged to constitute the offence occurred wholly outside New Zealand, proceedings may be brought for any offence against this Act committed in the course of carrying out a terrorist act (as defined in section 5(1) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002) or an offence against section 98AA, section 98A, section 98C, section 98D, any of sections 100 to 104, section 105(2), section 116, section 117, section 243, section 298A, or section 298B—

Even if the acts or omissions alleged to constitute the offence occurred wholly outside New Zealand, proceedings may be brought for an offence against section 98C or section 98D,—

Even if some or all of the acts alleged to constitute the offence occurred wholly outside New Zealand, proceedings may be brought for an offence against section 131B—

Neither section 8 nor section 400 applies to an offence referred to in subsection (1).

Nothing in subsections (1) to (3) limits or affects—

Proceedings for an offence against section 98AA, section 98A, section 116, section 117, section 243, section 298A, or section 298B cannot be brought in a New Zealand court against a person without the Attorney-General’s consent, if jurisdiction over the person is claimed by virtue of section 7A.

A person over whom jurisdiction is claimed by virtue of section 7A may be arrested for an offence against section 98AA, section 98A, section 116, section 117, or section 243, or a warrant for the person’s arrest for the offence may be issued and executed, and the person may be remanded in custody or on bail, even though the Attorney-General’s consent to the bringing of proceedings against the person has not been obtained.

Proceedings for an offence against this Act committed in the course of carrying out a terrorist act (as defined in section 5(1) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002) cannot be brought in a New Zealand court against a person without the Attorney-General’s consent, if jurisdiction over the person is claimed solely by virtue of section 7A.

This section applies to any act done or omitted beyond New Zealand by any person—

provided that paragraph (c) shall not apply where the act was done or omitted by a person, not being a British subject, on any ship or aircraft for the time being used as a ship or aircraft of any of the armed forces of a country that is not a Commonwealth country.

If a person does or omits to do any act to which this section applies, and that act or omission would, if it occurred within New Zealand, be an offence, under this Act or any other enactment (whether that enactment was passed before or after the commencement of this Act), punishable by imprisonment for life or by 2 or more years’ imprisonment, then, subject to the provisions of this Act and that other enactment, the person is liable on conviction as if the act or omission had occurred in New Zealand.

If any proceedings are taken by virtue of the jurisdiction conferred by this section, it is a defence to prove that the act or omission would not have been an offence under the law of the country of which the person charged was a national or citizen at the time of the act or omission, if it had occurred in that country.

Where at any place beyond New Zealand any person who belongs, or within 3 months previously has belonged, to any Commonwealth ship does or omits any act, whether on shore or afloat, not being an act or omission to which subsection (1) applies, and that act or omission would, if it occurred within New Zealand, be an offence punishable by imprisonment for life or by 2 or more years’ imprisonment, then this section shall apply in respect of that act or omission in the same manner in all respects as if it had occurred on board a Commonwealth ship.

The provisions of this section shall have the same operation in relation to the Republic of Ireland and to the citizens thereof, and to ships registered therein or belonging thereto, and to persons who belong or have belonged to those ships, and to all other persons on board those ships, as if the Republic of Ireland were a Commonwealth country and as if the citizens thereof were British subjects.

This section shall be read subject to the provisions of section 400.

In this section, the expression British subject includes a British protected person within the meaning of the British Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948.

Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to any offence against the Maritime Transport Act 1994 or Part 5A of the Civil Aviation Act 1990.

This section applies to every person who is—

Where—

that act or omission shall be deemed to have taken place within New Zealand.

No charging document may be filed against any person over whom jurisdiction is claimed by virtue of subsection (2) without the leave of the Attorney-General.

Subsection (5) applies to any offence before a charging document may be filed in respect of which the consent of the Attorney-General is required by subsection (3).

Where any person is alleged to have committed an offence to which this subsection applies,—

and he or she may be remanded in custody or on bail, notwithstanding that the consent of the Attorney-General has not been obtained to the filing of a charging document in respect of that offence; but no further proceedings shall be taken until that consent has been obtained.

No one shall be convicted of any offence at common law, or of any offence against any Act of the Parliament of England or the Parliament of Great Britain or the Parliament of the United Kingdom:

provided that—

Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under this Act and under any other Act, the offender may be prosecuted and punished either under this Act or under that other Act.

Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under 2 or more Acts other than this Act, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under any one of those Acts.

Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under 2 or more provisions of this Act or of any other Act, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under any one of those provisions.

No one is liable to be punished twice in respect of the same offence.

Notwithstanding any other enactment or rule of law to the contrary, no person shall be liable in any criminal proceedings in respect of an act or omission by him or her if, at the time of the act or omission, the act or omission by him or her did not constitute an offence.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or affect in any way any provision of any other Act conferring on any court any power to pass a sentence or impose a punishment or make an order in addition to or instead of a sentence or punishment prescribed by this Act, or otherwise to deal with any offender.

No offender shall be sentenced to solitary confinement.

Every reference in any enactment to solitary confinement, or to imprisonment in solitary confinement, shall hereafter be construed as a reference to imprisonment.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or affect any of the provisions of the Corrections Act 2004, or of any regulations thereunder, in respect of offences against discipline.

If the High Court imposes 1 or more fines, Part 3 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 applies to the fine or fines, subject to any necessary modifications and subject to the modifications in subsections (2) to (5).

Without limiting the actions that the High Court may take under Part 3 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 in relation to the fine or fines, the High Court may make any orders that it thinks fit, including a charging order or sale order in relation to the offender’s real property.

To avoid doubt, section 88A of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 does not apply if the High Court makes, in accordance with subsection (2), a charging order or sale order in relation to real property.

If an offender is sentenced by the High Court to community work, community detention, or home detention under section 88AE(1) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 or is imprisoned under a warrant of commitment issued under that section,—

Despite section 90 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957, the period of imprisonment that the High Court may impose on the offender for the non-payment of 1 or more fines must not exceed, for each fine, the lesser of—

If the High Court enforces 1 or more fines under this section, the court may, at the same time, enforce any outstanding fine or fines imposed on the offender by the District Court.

For the purposes of subsection (6), the outstanding fine or fines imposed by the District Court must be treated as if the fine or fines were imposed by the High Court and, in accordance with subsection (1), Part 3 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 applies to the fine or fines, subject to—

A Registrar of the District Court or of the High Court may exercise any jurisdiction and powers conferred on a Registrar of the District Court by Part 3 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 in respect of the fine or fines imposed by the High Court to which, under subsection (1), that Part applies.

A bailiff of the District Court may exercise any jurisdiction and powers conferred on a bailiff of the District Court by Part 3 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 in respect of the fine or fines imposed by the High Court to which, under subsection (1), that Part applies.

The amount of the fee payable if default is made in the payment of 1 or more fines imposed by the High Court to which, under subsection (1), Part 3 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 applies is the same as that prescribed by regulations, made under the Summary Proceedings Act 1957, in respect of enforcement action taken under that Act to enforce the fine or fines.

To avoid doubt, sections 92A to 92I of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 apply, subject to any necessary modifications, to any fine or fines imposed by the High Court, and accordingly, the chief executive of the Ministry of Justice may, among other things authorised by those sections, disclose information about default balances relating to such fine or fines in accordance with those sections.

For the purposes of this section, and subject to subsection (4), any reference in Part 3 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 to—

In this section, fine has the meaning given to it in section 79 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957.

All rules and principles of the common law which render any circumstances a justification or excuse for any act or omission, or a defence to any charge, shall remain in force and apply in respect of a charge of any offence, whether under this Act or under any other enactment, except so far as they are altered by or are inconsistent with this Act or any other enactment.

The matters provided for in this Part are hereby declared to be justifications or excuses in the case of all charges to which they are applicable.

No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of any act done or omitted by him or her when under the age of 10 years.

The fact that by virtue of this section any person has not been or is not liable to be convicted of an offence shall not affect the question whether any other person who is alleged to be a party to that offence is guilty of that offence.

No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of any act done or omitted by him or her when of the age of 10 but under the age of 14 years, unless he or she knew either that the act or omission was wrong or that it was contrary to law.

The fact that by virtue of this section any person has not been or is not liable to be convicted of an offence shall not affect the question whether any other person who is alleged to be a party to that offence is guilty of that offence.

Every one shall be presumed to be sane at the time of doing or omitting any act until the contrary is proved.

No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of an act done or omitted by him or her when labouring under natural imbecility or disease of the mind to such an extent as to render him or her incapable—

Insanity before or after the time when he or she did or omitted the act, and insane delusions, though only partial, may be evidence that the offender was, at the time when he or she did or omitted the act, in such a condition of mind as to render him or her irresponsible for the act or omission.

The fact that by virtue of this section any person has not been or is not liable to be convicted of an offence shall not affect the question whether any other person who is alleged to be a party to that offence is guilty of that offence.

Subject to the provisions of this section, a person who commits an offence under compulsion by threats of immediate death or grievous bodily harm from a person who is present when the offence is committed is protected from criminal responsibility if he or she believes that the threats will be carried out and if he or she is not a party to any association or conspiracy whereby he or she is subject to compulsion.

Nothing in subsection (1) shall apply where the offence committed is an offence specified in any of the following provisions of this Act, namely:

Where a woman who is married or in a civil union commits an offence, the fact that her spouse or civil union partner was present at the commission of the offence does not of itself raise a presumption of compulsion.

The fact that an offender is ignorant of the law is not an excuse for any offence committed by him or her.

Every ministerial officer of any court authorised to execute a lawful sentence, and every prison manager of any prison, and every person lawfully assisting any such ministerial officer or prison manager, is justified in executing the sentence.

Every ministerial officer of any court duly authorised to execute any lawful process of the court, whether of a civil or a criminal nature, and every person lawfully assisting him or her, is justified in executing it; and every prison manager required under the process to receive and detain any person is justified in receiving and detaining him or her.

Every one duly authorised to execute a lawful warrant issued by any court or Justice or Community Magistrate or other person having jurisdiction to issue the warrant, and every person lawfully assisting him or her, is justified in executing the warrant; and every prison manager required under the warrant to receive and detain any person is justified in receiving and detaining him or her.

If a sentence is passed or a process is issued by a court having jurisdiction under any circumstances to pass such a sentence or issue such a process, or if a warrant is issued by a court or person having jurisdiction under any circumstances to issue such a warrant, the sentence passed or process or warrant issued shall be sufficient to justify the execution of it by every officer, prison manager, or other person authorised to execute it, and by every person lawfully assisting him or her, notwithstanding that—

Every officer, prison manager, or person executing any sentence, process, or warrant, and every person lawfully assisting him or her, shall be protected from criminal responsibility if—

This section shall apply notwithstanding that, in fact,—

Every one acting under a warrant or process that is bad in law on account of some defect in substance or in form, apparent on the face of it, shall be protected from criminal responsibility to the same extent and subject to the same provisions as if the warrant or process were good in law if in good faith and without culpable ignorance or negligence he or she believed that the warrant or process was good in law; and ignorance of the law shall in this case be an excuse.

It is a question of law whether the facts of which there is evidence do or do not constitute culpable ignorance or negligence in his or her so believing the warrant or process to be good in law.

Every one duly authorised to execute a warrant to arrest who thereupon arrests a person, believing in good faith and on reasonable and probable grounds that he or she is the person named in the warrant, shall be protected from criminal responsibility to the same extent and subject to the same provisions as if the person arrested had been the person named in the warrant.

Every one called on to assist the person making such arrest, and believing that the person in whose arrest he or she is called on to assist is the person for whose arrest the warrant is issued, and every prison manager who is required to receive and detain the person arrested, shall be protected from criminal responsibility to the same extent and subject to the same provisions as if the person arrested had been the person named in the warrant.

Every constable is justified in arresting any person without warrant in accordance with the provisions of section 315 or in accordance with any other enactment conferring on him or her a power so to arrest.

Where under any enactment any constable has power to arrest without warrant any person who has committed an offence, the constable is justified in arresting without warrant any person whom he or she believes, on reasonable and probable grounds, to have committed that offence, whether or not the offence has in fact been committed, and whether or not the arrested person committed it.

Every officer or other person, not being a constable, who is authorised by any enactment to arrest any person without warrant is justified in so arresting any person in accordance with the provisions of that enactment.

Every one called upon by a constable to assist him or her in the arrest of any person believed or suspected to have committed any offence is justified in assisting unless he or she knows that there is no reasonable ground for the belief or suspicion.

Where by any enactment it is provided that any officer or person, not being a constable, may call upon any other person to assist him or her in arresting without warrant any one who has committed or is found committing any offence, every person so called upon is justified in assisting unless he or she knows that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed the offence.

Every one is justified in arresting without warrant—

Every one is protected from criminal responsibility for arresting without warrant any person whom he or she finds by night in circumstances affording reasonable and probable grounds for believing that that person is committing an offence against this Act.

Where any offence against this Act has been committed, every one who believes, on reasonable and probable grounds, that any person has committed that offence is protected from criminal responsibility for arresting that person without warrant, whether or not that person committed the offence.

Every one is protected from criminal responsibility for arresting without warrant any person whom he or she believes, on reasonable and probable grounds, to have committed an offence against this Act, and to be escaping from and to be freshly pursued by any one whom he or she believes, on reasonable and probable grounds, to have lawful authority to arrest that person for the offence.

This section shall apply whether or not the offence has in fact been committed, and whether or not the arrested person committed it.

Where any person is justified, or protected from criminal responsibility, in executing or assisting to execute any sentence, warrant, or process, or in making or assisting to make any arrest, that justification or protection shall extend and apply to the use by him or her of such force as may be necessary to overcome any force used in resisting such execution or arrest, unless the sentence, warrant, or process can be executed or the arrest made by reasonable means in a less violent manner:

provided that, except in the case of a constable or a person called upon by a constable to assist him or her, this section shall not apply where the force used is intended or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

Where any person is lawfully authorised to arrest or to assist in arresting any other person, or is justified in or protected from criminal responsibility for arresting or assisting to arrest any other person, that authority, justification, or protection, as the case may be, shall extend and apply to the use of such force as may be necessary—

unless in any such case the escape or rescue can be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner:

provided that, except in the case of a constable or a person called upon by a constable to assist him or her, this subsection shall not apply where the force used is intended or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

Where any prisoner of a prison is attempting to escape from lawful custody, or is fleeing after having escaped therefrom, every constable, and every person called upon by a constable to assist him or her, is justified in using such force as may be necessary to prevent the escape of or to recapture the prisoner, unless in any such case the escape can be prevented or the recapture effected by reasonable means in a less violent manner.

Every one is justified in using such force as may be reasonably necessary in order to prevent the commission of suicide, or the commission of an offence which would be likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the person or property of any one, or in order to prevent any act being done which he or she believes, on reasonable grounds, would, if committed, amount to suicide or to any such offence.

Every one who witnesses a breach of the peace is justified in interfering to prevent its continuance or renewal, and may detain any person committing it, in order to give him or her into the custody of a constable:

provided that the person interfering shall use no more force than is reasonably necessary for preventing the continuance or renewal of the breach of the peace, or than is reasonably proportionate to the danger to be apprehended from its continuance or renewal.

Every constable who witnesses a breach of the peace, and every person lawfully assisting him or her, is justified in arresting any one whom he or she finds committing it.

Every constable is justified in receiving into custody any person given into his or her charge, as having been a party to a breach of the peace, by one who has witnessed it or whom the constable believes on reasonable and probable grounds to have witnessed it.

Every one is justified in using such force as is necessary to suppress a riot, if the force used is not disproportionate to the danger to be apprehended from the continuance of the riot.