The Finance and Expenditure Committee has examined the Water Services Economic Efficiency and Consumer Protection Bill and recommends by majority that it be passed. We recommend all amendments by majority.

The Water Services Economic Efficiency and Consumer Protection Bill is part of the water services reforms launched by the Government in July 2020. It would establish an economic regulation and consumer protection regime for the water services sector, including the entities established by the Water Services Entities Act 2022. The Commerce Commission would be empowered to oversee the regime. The position of Water Services Commissioner would be established on the Commission’s board.

The bill would subject the new water services entities to the following forms of economic regulation: information disclosure, quality-only regulation, and price-quality regulation. It would also provide for rules and processes referred to as input methodologies for these forms of regulation.

• Information disclosure regulation would require the provider to publicly disclose information in accordance with the information disclosure requirements set out in the relevant determination provided for in clause 15.

• Quality regulation would require the provider to apply the “quality paths” (minimum standards) set by the Commission in respect of all water infrastructure services that the provider supplies, as specified in the determination provided for in clause 15.

• Price-quality regulation would require the provider to apply “price-quality paths” (maximum prices or revenue and minimum quality standards) set by the Commission in respect of all water infrastructure services that the provider supplies, as specified in the determination provided for in clause 15.

The Commission would be required to make and enforce a service quality code that would apply to the provision of water infrastructure services by regulated water services providers. The bill would establish an independent consumer dispute resolution service, subject to regular reviews by the Commission.

To fund the regime, the bill would provide for levies on regulated suppliers. It would also provide for remedies and enforcement mechanisms for breaches of regulatory obligations.

During our consideration of the bill, the Minister of Local Government announced his intention to make changes to the reform programme for water services entities. The changes would include increasing the number of publicly owned entities from four to 10. The Minister also signalled that the entities’ commencement would be staggered, starting from 1 July 2024, and ending no later than 1 July 2026.

We understand that these proposed changes would not affect the economic efficiency and consumer protection regime proposed by this bill, except for some dates and timeframes. Therefore, our report does not discuss any potential changes to the reforms following the Minister’s announcement.

As part of our consideration of the bill, we have examined its consistency with principles of legislative quality. We wish to bring the House’s attention to some issues relating to clauses 21, 22, 79(1)(a), and 141, which we discuss in more detail later in this commentary.

This commentary covers the main amendments we recommend to the bill as introduced. We do not discuss minor or technical amendments.

Part 2, clause 15 of the bill as introduced would provide for implementation of three types of economic regulation: information disclosure regulation, quality regulation, and price-quality regulation. In addition, as part of quality and price-quality regulation, the Commerce Commission would be able to impose performance requirements on regulated water services providers, such as requirements for the management of assets, investments, and revenue.

Clause 19 of the bill as introduced provides that information disclosure regulation would apply no later than 1 July 2027, and quality regulation would apply no later than the start of the first regulatory period. In the bill as introduced, these would be the same dates. Price-quality regulation would apply no later than the start of the second regulatory period, 3 years later. Clause 21 would allow the implementation date, and therefore also the start dates of the first and second regulatory periods, to be amended by Order in Council. Clause 22 as introduced provides the ability to change certain other dates—in particular, the dates by when the Commission has to make its initial input methodologies and determinations, that are central to the imposition of the different forms of economic regulation.

Some submitters considered that information disclosure by itself might be enough to achieve the purpose set out in clause 12, and questioned imposition of stricter types of regulation. They argued that price-quality regulation is unnecessary because it relates to the extraction of excessive profits, which they felt did not make sense for regulated water services providers that cannot pay dividends to shareholders. Some submitters also thought that the ability for the Commission to enforce performance requirements could be too onerous on regulated water services providers.

By contrast, the Commerce Commission supported the inclusion of quality and price-quality regulation in the bill. It considered that these forms of regulation would help to encourage efficiency.

We agree with the Commission. Information disclosure, while simple to implement, may not be enough to drive price stability and cost efficiency. As well as allowing flexibility to defer when price-quality regulation was introduced, the bill as introduced would allow the Minister, after a review carried out by the Commission, to disapply certain forms of regulation in the future.

It is true that regulated water services providers would not be able to pay dividends to shareholders. Nevertheless, they might be able to make excessive “profits” in the form of retained earnings. We see price-quality regulation as a tool that could incentivise improvements in efficiency over time for the regulated water services providers in the absence of demand from shareholders for a dividend.

We are mindful that both price-quality regulation and performance requirements would allow the Commission far-reaching powers over regulated water services providers’ operations. Even so, for the reasons stated above we consider the forms of economic regulation provided for in the bill to be appropriate. However, we recommend replacing clause 19(2) to provide that determinations made by the Commission under clause 15 could apply no earlier than the dates provided for in inserted clause 19(2).

Clauses 21 and 22 provide for the dates of certain milestones in the bill to be adjusted by Order in Council. Clause 21 provides that the implementation date may be deferred by up to 2 years. That power could only be exercised once. In the bill as introduced, the implementation date is used to determine when other things could happen under the bill, such as when the first regulatory period would start, or when deregulation reviews could occur. Clause 22 would enable other dates to be changed—as noted above, the dates by when the Commission must make its initial input methodologies and determinations that are central to the imposition of the different forms of economic regulation. Under the bill as introduced, these dates can be either deferred or, in one limited case, brought forward.

The effect of these clauses is to allow primary legislation to be overridden by secondary legislation. They are a type of “Henry VIII” power as they authorise a body other than Parliament to amend, suspend, or override primary legislation. The Regulations Review Committee has previously expressed the view that a Henry VIII provision should be included in a bill only in exceptional circumstances.

We consider that these clauses provide for a degree of flexibility that is necessary for the successful implementation of economic regulation in the water services context. However, we recommend removing clause 21 altogether and amending clause 22 to limit the Governor-General’s ability to adjust, by Order in Council, the dates by which the Commission must make various determinations. These changes would mean that the powers to use secondary legislation to adjust dates set out in the bill were more targeted, and with more certainty as to their limits.

Clause 4 of the bill as introduced sets out the functions of the Commission. Clause 4(2)(d) would allow the Commission to make available, or co-operate in making available, reports, summaries, and information in connection with water infrastructure services. Some submitters suggested that the Commission should have a reporting function similar to other players in the water services regulatory system, such as Taumata Arowai, councils, or the regional representative groups. We agree that this should be a requirement spelled out in the bill.

Some submitters identified inconsistencies between definitions of terms used in this bill and in the Water Services Entities Act 2022 and the Water Services Legislation Bill. We propose that the definitions be aligned for clarity.

We recommend replacing clause 4 to give effect to these changes and to otherwise improve consistency with other parts of the bill and other water services reform legislation.

While considering the bill and its companion bill, the Water Services Legislation Bill, we received correspondence from Waikato and Waipā River Iwi advocating that provision be made in the two bills for Te Ture Whaimana, an important planning document for the Waikato River. The aim would be to ensure consistency with the specific regional statutory regime created by the Waikato and Waipā River Settlement Deeds and associated River Settlement Acts. They recommended inserting reference to the Water Services Economic Efficiency and Consumer Protection legislation into section 17 of the Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010 and section 18 of the Ngati Tuwharetoa, Raukawa, and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010. They also recommended amendments to clause 5 of the bill as introduced. These amendments included:

• changing the weighting the Commerce Commission or Minister provides with respect to the Treaty, giving effect to Treaty settlement obligations and Te Mana o te Wai, so that, at the very least, they have “particular regard to” these (in the bill as introduced, decision makers are required to “take into account” these matters)

• specifically recognising Te Ture Whaimana in clause 5(2)(c)

• deleting clause 5(3).

We acknowledge the importance of the issues raised by Waikato and Waipā River Iwi, and have given them serious consideration. We acknowledge that water is a taonga of great importance to the partnership between the Crown and iwi, and that the Government is an agent of the Crown. However, on balance we consider that the bill as amended is consistent with Te Ture Whaimana, and we do not agree with the specific amendments suggested by Waikato and Waipā River Iwi. As to the suggested amendment to the Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act and the Ngati Tuwharetoa, Raukawa, and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act, we do not feel it would be appropriate for us to recommend changes to legislation that are not directly consequent to the bills referred to us for consideration.

Nevertheless, we recommend that the Government take account of this correspondence and the implications of changes in the water services area for Crown-Māori relations when undertaking further consideration of the bill and introducing additional primary and secondary legislation. We note that there is an ongoing process and conversation between Government and iwi aimed at finding appropriate solutions to the issues raised by Waikato and Waipā River Iwi.

Part 2, Subpart 7 (clauses 47 through 50) of the bill as introduced deals with reviews of water infrastructure services in relation to price-quality regulation. We believe these provisions should apply consistently to both price-quality regulation and consumer protection. We therefore recommend removing this subpart and instead inserting new subpart 2A in Part 5. This would provide for reviews of water infrastructure services that relate both to price-quality regulation, as provided for in Part 2 of the bill, and consumer protection, as provided for in Part 3.

In transferring these provisions to new Part 5, subpart 2A, we recommend several further changes, including the following:

• aligning the review provisions so they all require the Commission to do certain things (in the bill as introduced, some provisions use “must” and others “may”)

• specifying that the Commission must carry out a review if required to do so by the Minister (clause 139A(1))

• specifying that the Commission must consult on each proposed recommendation for its review and publish the reasons for its recommendations (clause 139B(3) and (5))

• specifying the outcomes of each review in detail, including what actions the Commission would be required to take following a Minister’s decision (clauses 139E, 139G, 139I, 139K, 139M and 139O)

• removing the requirement for the deregulation review and designation review to only occur after the implementation date (clause 47(2), as introduced)

• allowing the Commission to review whether a partially regulated water services entity (for instance, a regulated water services provider that is only subject to information disclosure) should be subject to further regulation. This could include regulating further water infrastructure services if only 1 or 2 of its water infrastructure services are subject to regulation at the time.

Part 2, subpart 9 of the bill would establish a process by which water services entities that are not statutory water services entities may be designated to make them subject to regulation for the purposes of Part 2. Part 3, subpart 1 of the bill would establish the same process for the purposes of Part 3.

We recommend several changes to the designation provisions in both subparts, including the following:

• inserting clause 53A to ensure consistency with other subparts of Part 2

• amending clause 55 to provide that the Minister could only recommend that a water services entity be designated a statutory water services entity after considering a recommendation from the Commission following a review under clause 48, and provided they were satisfied of the required matters under that clause.

• inserting clause 56(e) and (f) to expand the list of points that a designation order must specify

• removing clause 57(2) to remove the limit on how long a designation order applied

• amending clause 57(3) to clarify what would cease to apply when a water services entity ceased to be designated for the purposes of Part 2

• amending clause 58 to clarify the relationship between a designation order and a subsequent deregulation decision by providing that a designation order may be revoked following a review under clause 47

• removing clause 64, the process requirements of which would be provided for in inserted clause 139B.

Clause 60 sets out the purpose of Part 3 of the bill: to provide for consumer protection, and improvements in the quality of service provided to consumers by regulated water services providers and drinking water suppliers. Some submitters were concerned that this clause could lead to unlimited service quality improvements beyond those demanded by consumers, which could unnecessarily increase the costs and prices of regulated water services providers. We agree, and therefore recommend amending clause 60 to insert the words “to reflect consumer demands”. Doing so would also align clause 60 with clause 12(b).

Part 3, subpart 2 of the bill would require the Commission to make a service quality code in relation to the provision of 1 or more types of water infrastructure service by regulated water services providers. Clause 70 would provide for the code’s contents. Some submitters felt that the bill should be more prescriptive about those contents. They suggested including requirements for the code to address such matters as:

• consumer rights, in the event of complaints

• redress where the quality of service did not meet appropriate standards

• conditions for the provision of water services to customers experiencing hardship or other types of vulnerability.

We agree that the bill should be more specific about the service code’s contents. We recommend inserting clause 70(2) to provide that the code may (without limitation) do 1 or more of the things set out in our proposed paragraphs (a) through (g). We think that the Commission should be required to actively consider the interests of vulnerable consumers when making the service quality code. To that end, we recommend inserting clause 72(2A).

We also recommend amending clause 70(1)(c) to insert a cross-reference to proposed new section 325(1) of the Water Services Entities Act 2022, as proposed in clause 22 of the Water Services Legislation Bill.

Part 3, subpart 3 of the bill would require regulated water services providers and drinking water suppliers to establish a consumer complaints process. Clause 74 would enable a consumer who was dissatisfied with the outcome of that process to ask the consumer dispute resolution service (CDRS) to review the complaint. Schedule 2 sets out various provisions relating to the CDRS, including its purpose and establishment. Clause 10 of Schedule 2 would make the CDRS responsible for administering the code.

Several submitters suggested that the bill should provide more detail on the scope and role of the CDRS, including with respect to the service quality code. We agree, and recommend that Schedule 2 set out the scope of the CDRS, including with respect to the service quality code. This should be to manage consumer complaints that it receives in relation to the service quality code and to investigate disputes relating to the service quality code. It should not include responsibility for administering the code.

We therefore recommend amalgamating clauses 1 and 10 of Schedule 2 into a single clause that clearly sets out that the scope and role of the CDRS, as well as the CDRS’s relationship with the service quality code. Clause 1 should be amended to make clear that it is not the role of the CDRS to administer the code. Specifically, we recommend removing clause 10, amending clauses 1(1) and 1(2), and inserting clause 1(3).

We also consider that the price a regulated water services provider or drinking water supplier chooses to set should be outside the scope of the CDRS, because the CDRS provider is unlikely to have the expertise to determine appropriate prices. We therefore recommend inserting clause 1(4) in Schedule 2, to exclude prices and tariffs from the scope of the CDRS.

Clause 3 of Schedule 2 would set out the rules and obligations that apply to the CDRS provider. The bill as introduced would not set any limit on the compensation that could be awarded by the CDRS provider. Some submitters felt that it should, and suggested that the limit be aligned with other dispute resolution schemes with limits ranging from $15,000 to $200,000.

We agree that there should be a limit specified in the bill. However, we consider that $15,000 is too low, because it could narrow redress for consumers with higher-value disputes who cannot afford court proceedings. On the other hand, we consider that if a consumer had a dispute worth more than $50,000, it would be more appropriately addressed by the District Court, which allows representation, unlike the CDRS. This is also informed by the definition of “consumer” in clause 7, which would include most New Zealand households, territorial authorities, and large businesses. We are also concerned that a limit above $50,000 could lead to the CDRS becoming slow and formal like the courts.

We therefore recommend setting the limit at $50,000. To give effect to this, we recommend amending clause 3(1)(l) of Schedule 2 by removing the text in brackets. Instead, we recommend inserting clause 3A in Schedule 2 to provide for limits on compensation able to be ordered by the consumer dispute resolution service.

Clause 74(2)(d) would give the CDRS provider the discretion to decide to take no (or no further) action on a complaint if the complainant did not have sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the complaint. We think that consumer advocacy groups should be able to request action by the service provider on behalf of consumers, and are concerned that this clause would prevent them from doing so. We therefore recommend amending clause 74(2)(d) to enable this.

One of the purposes of the CDRS is to provide a means of dispute resolution that is separate from the courts. We therefore feel it is important to make clear that the CDRS would not allow for legal representation. However, some forms of representation may be appropriate in certain circumstances. We recommend inserting clause 3B into Schedule 2 to specify these circumstances. For example, a person could be represented by someone else if they were found to have a sufficient reason for being unable to appear in person or unable to present their case adequately.

We also recommend clarifying the relationship between possible concurrent proceedings of the CDRS and a court. New clause 3C would enable concurrent referral of a dispute to the CDRS and to a court. However, it would provide that a dispute referred to a court would continue if concurrently referred to the CDRS, unless ordered otherwise by the court, or a binding decision or a settlement agreement was in force. If a binding decision or a settlement agreement was in force, the concurrent proceeding would be stayed, but only in so far as the proceedings concerned the parties affected by the settlement agreement or binding decision.

Clause 77(1) of the bill would apply if a dispute arising from an unresolved complaint were referred by the consumer dispute resolution service provider or a consumer to the CDRS, and a determination was made on the dispute under the rules of the CDRS. Clause 77(2) provides that determinations made by the CDRS would be binding on the regulated water services provider or drinking water supplier, except if the consumer lodged an appeal under clause 78 and the court modified or reversed the determination. Clause 78 specifies the timeframe consumers would have to appeal a CDRS determination, and the powers of the court in such cases. The bill as introduced would not give the regulated water services provider or drinking water supplier the same right of appeal.

We accept that restricting the right of appeal to consumers would benefit consumers and could hasten the resolution of disputes by limiting the number of appeals. Nevertheless, we think it is unfair to limit the right of appeal to only one party to a dispute, particularly where the other party has no option but to participate in the dispute resolution service. We therefore recommend replacing clause 77(2) to extend the right of appeal to regulated water services providers and drinking water suppliers.

Clause 79(1)(a) of the bill would give parties 5 working days to bring an application for appeal. We think it would be fairer to give them more time. We therefore recommend amending this to 20 working days.

The bill provides for the economic regulation and consumer protection regime to be funded by levies paid by regulated water services providers. Clause 140 would enable the Governor-General, by Order in Council and on the recommendation of the Minister, to make regulations for various purposes, including fines and fees for infringements. Clause 141 would specifically enable the Governor-General to provide for regulated water services entities to pay a levy to the Crown, or a prescribed person on behalf of the Crown. Clause 142 would provide for a levy for consumer dispute resolution services.

We consider that it is appropriate for regulated water services providers to cover the cost of the economic regulation and consumer protection regime, such as the cost of continued development of technical documents, standards, and codes of practice. However, we believe that dispute resolution services should be funded by a combination of levies and fees. A levy would provide certainty of funding and cover the service’s basic operating costs. Fees for resolution of individual disputes would ensure that the costs of dispute resolution were distributed fairly between entities that have different numbers of disputes referred to the CDRS.

We therefore recommend inserting clause 140(ca) to provide for the payment of fees by water services providers and drinking water suppliers for dispute resolution under the consumer dispute resolution service. We recommend adding a levy power to fund consumer advocacy functions. We also recommend amending clause 141 to align it with levy provisions in other legislation relating to the Commerce Commission. To this end, we recommend replacing clause 141(3) through (9) with clause 141(2)(a) through (i) and new clause 141(3) through (8).

We think that the water services entities should support, enable, and be responsive to planning processes and growth, the construction of additional housing, and urban development in their areas. Because of this, we have specifically included the requirement that the dispute resolution mechanism be timely, practical and accessible. We feel that in the past, existing water services providers have not always been responsive to requests from developers that would support these aims. At the same time, we acknowledge that the entities would need to pursue these objectives in a way that was consistent with their role as water services providers, and with relevant local authority plans.

We think the way to balance these objectives and obligations is to require each entity to create a development code. We consider that the water services entities would be better placed than the Commission to determine the content of these codes. The codes’ authors are likely to require technical expertise on relevant matters, due to the unique circumstances of each entity, which the entity is more likely to have. For this reason we think that each water services entity should be required to draft its own code. However, we consider that the Commission should be responsible for approving a code once it has assessed that the code complies with this bill.

The Commission should also be responsible for enforcing the code, to ensure that developers have a way to resolve disputes with entities that exceed the maximum value for disputes addressed by the consumer dispute resolution service provided for in Part 3, subpart 3 of the bill. This would give developers an alternative to seeking redress through the courts, which can be costly and time-consuming.

Therefore, we recommend inserting clause 4(1)(c)(v) to provide for the Commission to act as regulator of water infrastructure services under the bill, including by ensuring that the development codes provided for in the Water Services Legislation Bill are prepared and approved. We recommend inserting clause 81B to provide for the Commission’s role in enforcing the codes. We recommend inserting clause 102B to provide that failure to comply with a development code would constitute an offence. We also recommend amendments to clauses 7, 81A, 84, 85, 88, 90, 101A, 102B, 104, 105, 106, and 130 to provide for the Commission’s role with respect to development codes. Under these amendments, the provisions for enforcing development codes would be the same as those that apply to the enforcement of service quality codes.

Finally, we recommend several changes to the Water Services Legislation Bill, which are discussed in our commentary on that bill.

The National Party supports appropriate economic and commercial regulation of water and wastewater services. However, National opposes this bill for the following reasons.

Firstly, we do not support the Government’s proposed wider water reforms which will lead to loss of ownership and control by the territorial local authorities of their water and wastewater operations. Furthermore, we do not support the new proposed governance arrangements, particularly the enshrinement of co-governance in these entities.

In terms of the Water Services Economic Efficiency and Consumer Protection Bill, we believe the bill is an overreach. The extent of the economic oversight is more appropriate to an environment where there are privately owned entities competing in an open market. However, under the proposed industry structure, this is not the case. The more significant issue of economic oversight is to ensure that the water entities spend appropriately on infrastructure to improve the quality of their services and invest sufficiently to meet future demands and do this at reasonable cost.

ACT engaged constructively through the select committee process because there are real problems with three waters infrastructure which need to be solved.

Water assets and networks need to function in a way that provides for urban intensification, suburban growth, and to protect the environment and human health.

ACT believes that the focus of reform to the water infrastructure sector must be on ensuring New Zealanders have access to affordable and safe drinking water, stormwater and wastewater infrastructure.

The cost and timing to provision of three waters infrastructure under current funding and financing models is a barrier to land development. This has led to a decrease in housing affordability compared to incomes, and a lack of land provisioned for urban development.

In addition, there has been consistent under-investment in existing underground pipe networks and wastewater infrastructure over many decades.

Despite regulations that require local government to have an asset management plan, to understand asset condition, to provide for depreciation and therefore asset renewals, they have not done so.

No action has been taken by central government to raise the standards of compliance with existing local government legislation as it relates to asset management, or to incentivise or penalise councils which fail to meet their statutory obligations.

The current system is not up to scratch, but the Government’s three waters reforms are not the answer.

This bill anticipates that because of the Government’s three waters reform, there is a risk that, without sufficient independent scrutiny, the new monopoly mega water services entities created by other legislation will act inefficiently, and water users could be subjected to excessive water charges.

The Government has therefore acted to establish an economic regulation and consumer protection regime for the three waters sector, and the Commerce Commission shall be the regulator.

The unfortunate Commerce Commission finds itself, not only in the awkward position of being a market regulator that is not regulating a market but a public service, but now a regulator of infrastructure needs as well, without the competency or tools to carry out that role.

Problems with the bill

The mechanisms contained in this bill are inadequate for a regulator to discover in a timely manner the current state of water infrastructure, assumed to be deficient in many towns and cities. This information will not be available until the end of the excessively long discovery period lasting 3 to 4 years.

Until the condition of these assets is discovered through investigation by asset owners, it is not possible to determine the cost to renew, maintain, and operate existing assets, many of which are at high risk of failure due to their age and deterioration.

There is capacity in the water engineering and contracting industry to carry out a rapid assessment of asset condition using CCTV, and in combination with pipe jetting and vacuuming to clear many blockages and prepare networks for subsequent routine maintenance activities.

If the Government was serious about understanding the condition of three waters assets, they could have simply required councils to carry out these asset condition surveys through amendments to the Local Government Act making this explicit, providing incentives where necessary, and penalties for failing to comply and report within acceptable timeframes.

There are inadequate mechanisms in the bill to negotiate, mediate, and arbitrate an outcome which gives effect to underlying planning and zoning provisions for growth. Land developers, manufacturers, and others that depend on timely provision of water services have pointed out that an entity may propose what they consider excessive fees and charges for connection, or for example simply refuse to provision services into areas identified for future urban growth.

Apart from the bill being fundamentally misconceived, the ACT Party also note the bill is incoherent. The role of the Commerce Commission is spread out over no less than six clauses (s.4 functions, s.5 matters to be considered, s.6 Treaty duties, s.12 pricing, s.14 infrastructure regulator, s.60, etc).

The Commission is not only being asked to go from being a regulator of markets, into now a regulator of Te Tiriti obligations (whatever those are—the bill is silent on this), Te Mana o te Wai (and its spiritual belief in mauri—a life force that permeates all things), mitigating and adapting to climate change and natural hazards, and supporting growth and development. Even just one of those criteria would be daunting, even for an agency that specialises in those areas.

However, if such criteria are being put into law, it is the responsibility of Parliament to clearly state what these are. Clause 7 provides many detailed interpretations of terms used in the bill. The bill should do the same with terms such as “te Tiriti o Waitangi” (presumably this means the actual text, in which case which version?), principles of the Treaty (in which case, what are these?), how “Te Mana o te Wai” is defined in a way that is scientifically credible and based in something other than spiritual belief), and what levels of growth and urban development are being sought (and are these subject to a cost–benefit analysis?).

ACT’s solution is simple. Water infrastructure is owned in common by the citizens of that area, and is managed by democratically elected councils. It is for councils, answerable to their voters, who deal with matters such as pricing and quality. Drinking water standards should be set by the water regulator Taumata Arowai. ACT proposes that councils report on their infrastructure needs and costs and how these will be paid for to an independent Infrastructure Commissioner, who reports publicly on how councils are performing.

ACT proposes a practical Water Infrastructure Plan to return $1.2 billion each year to local councils, a half-share of the GST collected by the Government on all new builds. Long-term 30-year central government-local government partnership agreements would plan water infrastructure upgrades tailored to specific regions. Public-private partnerships between councils and developers would deliver urgently needed major projects by attracting investment from financial entities such as KiwiSaver funds, ACC, and iwi.

ACT opposes this bill, and should we be a part of a future Government we will seek to repeal it, in part or in whole.