Section 17(1) of the Constitution Act provides that Parliament’s term, unless sooner dissolved, shall be no longer than 3 years from the day fixed for the return of the writs issued for the last preceding general election. We recommend amending section 17(1) by replacing the reference to “3” years with “4”.

Clause 5(2) of the bill, which would replace section 17(2) of the Constitution Act, contains the variable term and select committee proportionality settings. In light of our decision not to support a variable term, we recommend deleting clause 5(2).

Part 2 of the bill would amend the Electoral Act. Section 268 of the Electoral Act sets out six “reserved provisions”, which are also known as “entrenched provisions”. These provisions cannot be repealed or amended unless passed by a 75 percent majority of the House or carried by a majority of votes in a national referendum. Section 268(1)(a) provides that the term of Parliament is entrenched through a cross-reference to section 17(1) of the Constitution Act.

Clause 8 of the bill as introduced would replace section 268(1)(a) of the Electoral Act to also entrench the following provisions:

• section 17(2) of the Constitution Act, so far as it relates to 4 years for a term of Parliament

• section 17(4) of the Constitution Act, relating to the proportionality requirement for a 4-year term.

We recommend deleting clause 8. These entrenchment provisions would no longer be needed if the House accepts our recommendation to delete clause 5(2) with its provision for a variable 4-year term (section 17(2)) and proportionality requirements (section 17(4)). We note that the term of Parliament would continue to be entrenched through the existing reference to section 17(1) of the Constitution Act.

We understand that the current title of the bill is intended to reflect the concept of a variable term and the naming conventions for omnibus bills. However, our proposed recommendation to implement a maximum 4-year term would effectively change the bill from an omnibus bill to an amendment bill. As amended, the bill would amend the Constitution Act, with a minor consequential amendment to the Electoral Act. Therefore, we recommend amending the title of the bill to “Constitution (4-year Term of Parliament) Amendment Bill”. We think this title provides sufficient clarity about the specific change that the bill is progressing.

Clause 2 sets out when the bill’s provisions would come into force. This would be linked to the holding of a referendum. The main amendments would come into force if the results of the referendum declared that a majority of electors supported a change to a 4-year term. In this case, clause 2(2) specifies that most provisions in the bill would come into force on the day that the writ was issued for the first general election following the referendum results.

We consider that the bill as introduced is unclear as to what constitutes a majority of electors. For example, it could be interpreted as requiring either a majority of those enrolled to vote or those who actually voted in a referendum. We understand that it is intended to refer to electors who vote in a referendum. We recommend amending clause 2(2) to make this intent clear. Under our proposed amendment, the support needed for the bill’s changes to come into force would be the majority of electors voting in a referendum. This is also consistent with section 268(2)(b) of the Electoral Act, which sets out that changing an entrenched provision via a referendum requires a simple majority of the valid votes cast.

Clause 2(2) of the bill as introduced specifies that most provisions would come into force only if the majority of electors in a referendum responded to the question specified in subsection (3) with the affirmative option specified in subsection (4). Clause 2(3) provides the wording of the question to be put to electors in the referendum. Clause 2(4) sets out the two options for voters to respond to that question.

Because we do not support the variable term proposed in the bill as introduced, we propose amending the referendum question and options. We propose that electors be given the choice between retaining the current 3-year maximum term of Parliament or changing to a 4-year maximum. We would like to emphasise that it needs to be explicitly clear to electors what they are voting for.

We received advice on how to appropriately frame the referendum question and options. We considered several choices and recommend amending clause 2(3) to specify that the question would be “Which option do you vote for?”, and amending clause 2(4) to provide the following options:

• I vote to keep the maximum term of Parliament at 3 years.

• I vote to change the maximum term of Parliament to 4 years.²

Section 3B of the Electoral Act deals with the “regulated period” in relation to a general election. Section 3B(5) defines the “default day” as “the day that is 2 years and 9 months after the polling day for the preceding general election”. Clause 7 of the bill as introduced would replace the definition of “default day” in section 3B with one that recognises that the term of a Parliament could be 3 or 4 years. As we are proposing a maximum term of 4 years, we recommend amending the definition in section 3B(5) by replacing the reference to “2 years and 9 months” with “3 years and 9 months”. This change would only come into force if the main change to the 4-year term was supported in a referendum.

A number of submitters commented on the effect of the bill on local government. Local government election dates are fixed in legislation as every three years. Although they are intended never to coincide with the general election, it is theoretically possible because the parliamentary election date is not fixed.

Many submitters considered that a 4-year term of Parliament should be replicated in local government, and that not making the change simultaneously would have significant democratic and practical implications. All but 1 of the 17 councils that submitted explicitly recommended that local government should move to a 4-year term if Parliament did. Reasons for supporting synchronisation included preventing disruption to long-term planning and budgeting processes and enhancing collaboration between central and local government. Submitters were also concerned that a variable term could increase the likelihood of general and local elections coinciding. This could result in administrative challenges, voter confusion, and local issues being overshadowed.

We sought advice on whether the bill could be amended to also apply a 4-year term to local government. We were advised that the amendments would be outside the scope of the bill. This is because the length of the local government term is not part of the bill’s single broad policy. (As previously noted, that policy is to provide an option to extend the term of Parliament to 4 years in certain circumstances.) Extending the 4-year term to local government would also require amendments to legislation that the bill as introduced does not propose to amend.

We acknowledge this advice. However, we are strongly of the view that the terms should align. We therefore think that, prior to a referendum being held, consideration should be given to aligning the term of local government with the term of Parliament.

Clause 3(1)(b) of the bill as introduced provides that the legislation would be repealed if no referendum was conducted concurrently with either of the next 2 general elections held after the section commenced. If that subsection applied, the date of repeal would be 31 October 2031.

We note that, in principle, the Government has agreed that a referendum may be held alongside the next General Election in 2026 if the bill is enacted. It intends to confirm the exact timing of any referendum when the bill’s progress is more certain.

We have not expressed a view as to whether the referendum should occur in 2026 or 2029. However, we wish to highlight two matters. First, we are currently considering the Electoral Amendment Bill, which would make a range of changes to the Electoral Act ahead of the 2026 General Election. We recognise that implementing the changes may affect the Electoral Commission’s capacity to also administer the referendum in 2026. Second, we understand that the Government has committed to implementing an information programme for the term of Parliament referendum. Budget 2025 contains funding for the operational delivery of a referendum and a public information programme. We note that holding the referendum at the 2026 general election would create a very “small window” for a public education campaign. We encourage the Government to take both these matters into account when deciding the referendum date.

ACT supports the idea of moving to a 4-year parliamentary term only if stronger checks and balances are built into the system to prevent an erosion of democratic accountability. A longer term must not mean a stronger executive with less oversight.

ACT’s position, as set out in our 2023 election policy and reflected in the National–ACT Coalition Agreement, was that any extension to the term must be conditional on a clear shift in the balance of power at select committees toward the opposition. This was not an ancillary detail. It was the essential safeguard that made a 4-year Parliament term worth considering. Without it, the bill falls short of the constitutional improvement New Zealanders deserve.

A first reading of this bill was secured in the National–ACT Coalition Agreement. Our original proposal, as referred to the Justice Committee, ensured:

• Select committees were proportionally based on non-executive membership of the House, giving the opposition greater influence and reducing the ability of the executive to dominate scrutiny.

• The change was approved by the public in a referendum.

While ACT acknowledges the issues raised by submitters in relation to legislating select committee proportionality, we do see it as an essential safeguard. It would ensure that a longer parliamentary term did not weaken oversight by:

• Increased the likelihood of opposition majorities on key subject select committees.

• Enabled more rigorous questioning of Ministers and officials, comparable to the success of the Opposition-chaired Epidemic Response Committee.

• Given voters a clear assurance that if the Government had more time between elections, Parliament would have more power to hold it to account.

Without this safeguard:

• A 4-year term risks concentrating too much power in the hands of the executive.

• The public may see the change as a self-serving move by politicians rather than a balanced reform, undermining confidence in the process and the referendum result.

• It removes the very protection that could have built long-term trust in a longer parliamentary term.

ACT believes in limited government, strong parliamentary oversight, and meaningful accountability. A 4-year term without stronger opposition powers at select committees tips the balance too far in favour of the Government of the day.

ACT proposed an amendment to the re-drafted bill which would have more simply tied the commencement of the bill to select committee composition. This amendment was not accepted by the committee.

For ACT, the proportionality requirement is not optional. It is the mechanism that would make a longer term acceptable to the public and credible as a constitutional improvement. Without it, the proposal fails to meet the standard of accountability that New Zealand’s democracy requires.