on the dates set out in Schedule 2; and

after the last of those dates, 4 times a year at reasonably regular intervals.

must be consistent with the indicative schedule set by regulation 6; and

must not breach the date restrictions set by regulation 8.

that they know to be the same date as a relevant announcement; or

that is during the period of 20 working days before 31 May (which is the deadline for surrendering units under section 65(4) of the Act).

has the meaning given in section 29 of the Interpretation Act 1999; but

does not include any provincial public holiday (being a public holiday that is the day of the anniversary of any province or the day locally observed as that day).

the auction dates set for the year; and

for each auction, the number of New Zealand units expected to be available to sell at the auction (that is, the distributed volume: see regulation 13).

an outage occurs that lasts for longer than 5 minutes:

any outage occurs during the final 30 minutes of the bidding window:

the cumulative outage time exceeds 15 minutes.

must be as soon as is reasonably practicable after the original scheduled date and in the same calendar year; and

must not breach the date restrictions set by regulation 8.

must make the new date publicly available and notify all registered bidders, in writing, of the new date; and

must hold an auction on the new date unless the auction is postponed again under regulation 10.

the cumulative volume; and

any reserve volume that is released for sale after the end of the auction’s bidding window.

the New Zealand units available for sale by auction—

the approved overseas units used—

the overall limit is the number of units stated for that year in column 4 of the table.

approved overseas units used, New Zealand units available by auction, and New Zealand units available by other means have the meanings given in section 30GB(8) of the Act; and

overall limit has the meaning given in section 30GB(2)(a)(iii) of the Act.

New Zealand units must not be sold at auction for a price that is less than the minimum price stated for that year in column 2 of the table (the prescribed minimum price); and

the trigger prices are the prices stated for that year in column 3 of the table; and

the reserve amount of New Zealand units for each trigger price is the number of units stated for that trigger price in column 4 of the table.

if the price is greater than the lowest trigger price for the auction, must be recalculated as that trigger price (despite the initial calculation); and

if the price (as recalculated or, if not, as initially calculated) is greater than the prescribed minimum price for the auction, becomes the confidential reserve price below which New Zealand units must not be sold at the auction.

consider the main matters and additional matters in section 30GC(5) and (6) of the Act; and

ensure that the methodology promotes the purpose of confidential reserve prices, which is to prevent sales by auction under section 6A of the Act at prices significantly below the prices of New Zealand units sold at the time in other ways (on secondary markets) so that the sales by auction do not unduly affect secondary markets; and

ensure that the methodology includes—

the Minister of Finance; and

the 1 or more auction monitors, if any.

must ensure that the methodology is set, and remains set, from the commencement of this regulation; but

may change the methodology by setting it differently at any time.

review the methodology by complying with regulation 15A as if setting the methodology; and

if required, change the methodology by setting it under that regulation.

the auction date and bidding window:

the cumulative volume available for sale at the auction and the number of units within the cumulative volume, if any, that are unsold units from previous auctions in the same calendar year:

any trigger prices and reserve volumes for the auction:

the prescribed minimum price for the auction:

a statement that there may also be a confidential reserve price for the auction that is not known to bidders:

a statement that only those who are registered bidders immediately before the start of the auction’s bidding window are eligible to submit a bid at the auction:

the date by which collateral must be provided for bids at the auction (which must be 3 working days before the date of the auction):

a statement that the Crown (as defined in regulation 19(2)) is not entitled to register as a bidder or submit a bid at the auction.

the information specified in subclause (2), not including subclause (2)(e); and

a statement that only those who are registered bidders immediately before the start of the original bidding window and immediately before the start of the rescheduled auction’s bidding window are eligible to submit a bid at the auction.

guidance material for potential bidders, including guidance on how to participate in an auction, how to provide collateral for bids, and how the auction process will run:

the application form for bidder registration (see regulation 20(5)):

the terms and conditions that a bidder must agree to when submitting a bid at an auction (see regulation 26).

was a registered bidder immediately before the start of the original bidding window; and

is a registered bidder immediately before the start of the rescheduled auction’s bidding window.

any 1 or more of the persons who hold the account jointly, or any of their primary representatives, may apply for the joint account holders to each be registered bidders; and

each reference in regulation 20 to an account holder must be read as a reference to each person who holds the holding account jointly.

means the Sovereign in right of New Zealand; and

includes all Ministers of the Crown and all departments; but

does not include—

notifying the Registrar, in the manner required by the Registrar for this purpose, of the person’s intention to apply; and

submitting an application to the auction operator in the form approved for that purpose by the auction operator and made publicly available under regulation 17.

the status of the applicant (that is, whether the applicant is an account holder or a primary representative):

for the purpose of enabling the auction operator to verify the applicant’s identity as an account holder or their primary representative, the unique identifier assigned to the applicant by the Registrar to facilitate the operation of the unit register:

the account holder’s full legal name and trading name (if different):

the full name of each of the account holder’s primary representatives (if any):

if the account holder is a company, the business number (NZBN) assigned to the company under the New Zealand Business Number Act 2016:

the account holder’s principal business address or registered office address:

either—

the full names and contact details of anyone that the account holder or their primary representative authorises to bid on their behalf at an auction (as a proxy bidder).

confirmation that the applicant has notified the Registrar of their intention to make the application; and

confirmation that the applicant authorises the auction operator to verify with the Registrar—

a declaration that the information provided in the application is true and correct.

the applicant’s identity as an account holder or their primary representative; and

that the applicant’s registration details align with any corresponding information that is held in the unit register.

register the account holder, or each person who holds the account jointly, as a bidder; and

notify the applicant, whether that is an account holder or their primary representative, that the account holder, or each person who holds the account jointly, is a registered bidder and is therefore entitled to submit bids at an auction.

decline the application; and

notify the applicant of that decision and the reasons for it.

starts at 9 am on the day of the auction; and

ends at 12 pm on the same day.

the number of New Zealand units (a bid volume) sought, which must be at least 500 and a multiple of 100; and

the price per New Zealand unit (a bid price) that the bidder will pay, which must—

collateral for the bid; and

if the collateral is provided in the form of cash, details of the bank account to which the amount provided should be returned if necessary.

cash paid into a collateral account; or

a negotiable instrument that, in substance, secures payment of, or performance of the obligation to pay, an amount that is 25% of what the bidder would be required to pay if their bid were successful.

the person requests otherwise under subclause (4); or

the amount is, or may become, forfeit to the Crown under regulation 35, in which case the auction operator must return only what is not forfeit.

that collateral in the form of cash be applied towards the payment for any New Zealand units purchased at the auction; or

that collateral in the form of a negotiable instrument be—

multiple bids by a bidder at an auction; or

bids at more than 1 auction.

the auction operator may impose a term or condition only if they are satisfied that it is necessary or desirable—

the terms and conditions are enforceable only to the extent that they are necessary for either of those purposes.

comply with the requirements set out in regulation 24; and

be submitted in the manner required by the auction operator.

accept the bid, unless there is a reason to reject it under subclause (4); and

advise the bidder whether their bid was accepted or rejected and, if their bid was rejected, why it was rejected.

the bid is not made in accordance with subclauses (1) and (2); or

the auction operator cannot verify the bidder’s registration details; or

the collateral required for the bid by regulation 25 was not provided at least 3 working days before the auction date; or

the bidder did not agree to the auction terms and conditions before submitting the bid (see regulation 26).

amend the bid by submitting an amendment request to the auction operator; or

withdraw the bid by submitting a withdrawal request to the auction operator.

in the case of an amendment request, include an amended bid that complies with the requirements set out in regulation 24; and

in any case, be submitted in the manner required by the auction operator.

either—

advise the bidder whether their request was accepted or rejected and, if their request was rejected, why it was rejected.

rank the bids in order of bid price, so that—

allocate the distributed volume to bids in accordance with regulation 31, starting with the highest-ranked bid; and

determine an interim clearing price in accordance with regulation 32.

the rollover volume is greater than zero; and

in a case in which there is a confidential reserve price, the interim clearing price determined under subclause (1)(c) is greater than or equal to the confidential reserve price.

in accordance with regulation 31, and reassessing any bid that was allocated less than its bid volume at step 1, allocate the rollover volume to bids; and

redetermine an interim clearing price in accordance with regulation 32.

reverse the allocation of the rollover volume under subclause (3)(a); and

proceed to step 4.

release for sale at the auction the reserve volume for that trigger price; and

in accordance with regulation 31, and reassessing any bid that was allocated less than its bid volume at step 1 or 2, allocate to bids the reserve volume released under paragraph (a); and

redetermine the interim clearing price in accordance with regulation 32.

subclause (1)(c) if—

subclause (3)(b) in any other case.

release for sale at the auction the reserve volume for that trigger price; and

in accordance with regulation 31, and reassessing any bid that was allocated less than its bid volume in an earlier round at step 4, allocate to bids the reserve volume released under paragraph (a); and

redetermine the interim clearing price in accordance with regulation 32.

determine the final clearing price in accordance with regulation 32; and

sell units at that price if required by regulation 33 (if there are successful bids under that regulation).

apply subclauses (2) to (7) (as applicable) to each bid in order of rank, starting with the highest-ranked bid; and

if any bid is allocated less than its bid volume under subclause (3) or (6), allocate zero New Zealand units to every lower-ranked bid; and

from any reserve volume that is released, allocate zero New Zealand units to every bid with a bid price that is less than the trigger price for that reserve volume.

each tied bid is allocated its proportional share of the remaining volume, rounded as necessary under subclause (7); and

if the remaining volume after allocations under paragraph (a) is 100 units or more, the remaining volume is distributed, in 100-unit lots, among the related tied bids at random.

must be rounded down to the nearest 100 units; and

may be rounded down to zero.

at step 1, 2, or 4 of the process set out in regulation 30 (an interim clearing price); or

at step 5 of the process set out in regulation 30 (the final clearing price).

there is a confidential reserve price at the auction; and

the final clearing price is less than the confidential reserve price.

provided any amount of collateral for the bid in the form of cash paid into a collateral account; and

requested that it be applied towards the payment for any New Zealand units purchased at the auction (see regulation 25(4)(a)).

treat as much of the collateral as is needed to pay for the units as payment or part-payment received for the units; and

transfer that amount, within 4 working days after the auction date, from the collateral account to the settlement account.

the required payment is paid into the settlement account; and

it is no longer possible to reverse the payment and the funds are available for use by the Crown.

if the auction operator is the Minister, direct the Registrar to transfer the units from the Crown holding account to the holding account listed for that purpose in the bidder’s registration details; or

if the auction operator is an agent appointed by the Minister under section 6A(b) of the Act, ask the Minister to direct the Registrar to transfer units as described in paragraph (a).

the final clearing price:

the total auction volume, which is the sum of the cumulative volume for the auction and any reserve volume that was released for sale:

the total number of bidders at the auction (excluding any whose bids were all withdrawn before the end of the bidding window):

the total bid volume, which is the sum of the bid volumes of all the bids made and not withdrawn:

the average bid volume, which is the total bid volume divided by the number of bids made and not withdrawn:

the cover ratio, which is the total bid volume divided by the total auction volume:

the number of bidders at the auction who made successful bids:

the number of units not sold at the auction, if any:

a statement that the number of units not sold at the auction may increase if any auction sales are not settled in time.

details of the calculation of the price using the methodology set under regulation 15A; and

the bid volume and bid price of each bid in a form that does not identify the bidder.